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Water Supply in the Northeast:
A Study in Regulatory Failure
Ann J. Gellis*
INTRODUCTION
Water is a plentiful resource in the Northeastern' United States. 2
Water supply management in the region is complicated, however, by
droughts3 and the fact that water sources are not always within the con-
venient reach of population centers. These climatic and geographical
conditions should not present Northeastern water management institu-
tions with any insurmountable problems. Nevertheless, residents of the
region have periodically suffered severe water shortages. These shortages
are man-made. They occur because the states of the region lack the insti-
Copyright © 1985 by ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
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Tarlock, Illinois Institute of Technology, Kent College of Law, Chicago, both of whom read
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1. This article will use the terms "Northeastern" and "Northeast" as defined in the 1977
Army Corps of Engineers study entitled NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES WATER SUPPLY
STUDY SUMMARY REPORT. The Corps included the following twelve states within its defini-
tion: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS, NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES WATER SUPPLY STUDY SUMMARY REPORT 1
(1977) [hereinafter cited as NEWS STUDY].
2. For a description of the annual distribution of rainfall in the region, see 2 U.S.
WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 1975-2000 3 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT]; Water Resources Problems Affect-
ing the Northeast: The Drought, and Present and Future Water Supply Problems, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transpor-
tation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings].
3. The Northeast's most severe drought in the last hundred years occurred between
1961 and 1966, when the region suffered a precipitation deficit of over 50 inches. 1981 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 110.
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tutional arrangements necessary to provide a sufficient supply of water to
all their residents in times of drought.
In the Northeast during the fall and winter of 1980-81, a combina-
tion of hydrological factors, including subnormal rainfall, left little runoff
to fill the regiofi's reservoirs. 4 The most recent drought showed that the
water supply institutions of the Northeastern states have serious short-
comings. Among the problems are wide variations in storage capacities
among local water supply systems, a lack of adequate infrastructure
(such as interconnecting pipelines), and a lack of cooperation and coordi-
nation between state, municipal, and private water supply institutions.
Because of these impediments to rational and efficient distribution, neigh-
boring communities that experienced the same amount of rainfall often
faced dramatically different water supply conditions during the drought.
Some communities had more than enough water, while others had too
little. 5
The legal structure determining the supply of water for public use
can be divided into two parts. The first part, an outgrowth of property
law, governs the allocation of rights to water resources. The second part,
growing out of laws concerning the relationship between state and local
governments and the regulation of public utilities, governs the diversion,
storage, and distribution of water once public water supply systems have
acquired water rights.
During the last century our society shifted from one in which most
citizens depended on their own private water supply to one in which
most citizens are served by public water supply systems. 6 This shift has
generated the development of new laws regulating the organization and
operation of public water supply systems. In the Northeast, where water
is relatively plentiful, these regulatory laws have become more important
in determining the adequacy and cost of water supply than the laws relat-
ing to the initial allocation of water rights.
Most legislative efforts to solve the Northeast's water supply
shortages have addressed the problem primarily as one of allocation. A
4. A significant portion of precipitation is lost to potential human use by evaporation
and by transpiration from the Earth's vegetation. The national average annual precipitation is
30 inches, of which 70% is lost through evapotranspiration. The remaining 30% is runoff
which flows into streams and rivers. U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S
WATER RESOURCES, SUMMARY REPORT 1-3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FIRST NATIONAL
WATER ASSESSMENT]; NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
xxv, xxvii (1973). From June 1980 through January 1981, the Northeast received only 70% of
its normal rainfall for this period. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 7. In addition, during the
summer of 1980, evapotranspiration averaged from 15 to 20 inches, an abnormally high
amount for the Northeast. Id. at 114.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 117-25 for a discussion of the problems that oc-
curred during the 1980-81 drought.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 34-53 for a description of the development of pub-
lic water supply systems in the United States.
[Vol. 12:429
WATER SUPPLY IN THE NOR THEAST
broader perspective, which includes the laws and legal institutions deter-
mining how water supplies are distributed, reveals in each state a com-
plex web involving many different actors. A legal structure has evolved
with no central conception of how the parts of the whole should work
together rationally to develop a water supply system that satisfies the
public's needs and preferences.
This Article offers ideas on how a state can manage its water re-
sources to assure a sufficient supply of water for all its citizens, regardless
of their location. While water supply problems do not respect state bor-
ders'any more than they do local jurisdictional lines, this Article focuses
only on intrastate decisional structures. 7 Section I describes the North-
east's water resources, the nature of demand, the historical development
of public water supply systems, and the organization of those systems
today. Section II examines the existing legal structures which determine
public water supply in the Northeastern states. Because the best way to
understand how these complex structures work is to study them in ac-
tion, Section II includes case studies of three representative states that
were particularly hard hit in the 1980-81 drought: Connecticut, New
Jersey, and New York. Sections I and II show that water distribution in
the Northeast is highly fragmented with respect to the number of systems
and the legal environments in which they operate. Section III considers
the two main consequences of this fragmentation. First, fragmentation
produces inefficient resource use due to a duplication of facilities and
higher operational costs. Second, the Northeastern states are unable to
assure all their citizens adequate water supplies during droughts. Section
III concludes that, given the absence of pressures on existing institutions,
state-mandated regionalization is required to ensure the consolidations
necessary for a dependable water supply both in times of plenty and
times of drought.
I
WATER AVAILABILITY, DEMAND, AND SUPPLY SYSTEMS
A. Natural Availability
All of the Earth's water resources come from precipitation, two-
thirds of which returns to the atmosphere through direct evaporation or
is consumed by vegetation through transpiration (the combination of the
two processes being referred to as "evapotranspiration"). 8 The remain-
ing third, which either flows into streams and rivers or seeps into the
7. Furthermore, this Article emphasizes issues regarding the quantity, not the quality,
of water, although many of the factors that lead to an inadequate quantity of water also ad-
versely affect water quality. For example, groundwater overdraft in coastal areas can lead to
saltwater intrusion.
8. FIRST NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 1-3.
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ground, constitutes runoff and is available for human use. The extent of
an area's runoff, and hence its potential water supply, depends on how
much precipitation the area receives and the amount of evapotranspira-
tion that occurs. These factors may vary from watershed to watershed 9
and from one time period to another. A major goal of water resources
management is to protect the public against flood and drought conditions
which result from wide fluctuations in runoff.
Most parts of the Northeast have an average annual runoff that is
twice the national average, as well as a lower rate of evapotranspiration.
In addition, the amount of runoff is more consistent from year to year
than in other regions of the United States. l°
B. Demand: Trends and Projections
Throughout this century the nation's demand for water has steadily
increased, while the natural supply has remained inevitably fixed. In
1900 the total national withdrawal was forty billion gallons per day
(bgd); I I by 1975 it had grown tenfold, to 398 bgd. 12 This increased de-
mand was due to population growth, higher standards of living, and
technological advances. 13 Per capita consumption of water increased as
the level of urbanization and industrial development increased. 14 From
9. A "watershed" is "a geographic area which drains into a particular water body."
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 4, at xxvii.
10. FIRST NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 1-4. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
11. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 7.
12. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 111-2. Of the total water
withdrawal, 85% is fresh water and 15% is salt water, used primarily for industrial purposes.
Id. at 111-15.
13. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, WATER SUPPLY PLANNING: A CASE STUDY AND
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 25 (1976).
14. In general, the more industrialized an area, the greater its per capita use of water due
to increased manufacturing, greater population densities, and higher income levels. As income
levels increase, people can afford to buy more water-consuming devices, such as dishwashers,
air conditioners, and garbage disposals, and generally own larger homes with larger and thirst-
ier lawns. Wolman, Water Resources, A Report to the National Academy of Sciences, in
WATER, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY 8-9 (G. White ed. 1969); M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON,
supra note 13, at 25-26; SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 111-15. See
also Foster & Beattie, Urban Residential Demand for Water in the United States, 55 LAND
ECON. 47 (1979), for a review of the studies which have found high correlations between use
and per capita income.
The Second National Water Assessment projected .that by the year 2000, total water with-
drawals in the Northeast will decrease an estimated 10% from 1975 levels, due mainly to
manufacturers' conservation efforts. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2,
at 111-19 to 111-20. Recently the Army Corps of Engineers conducted a study of the Housa-
tonic River Basin, which extends over parts of western Connecticut, southwestern Massachu-
setts, and eastern New York. The study predicts increases in domestic and commercial
demand, although at a rate slower than that which occurred from 1965-1975 (0.5 gallons per
capita per day (gpcd), compared with one gpod during the earlier period). The projections
assume that price increases and conservation efforts will combine to reduce demand. U.S.
[Vol. 12:429
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1900 to 1970, the per capita water withdrawal increased three and one-
half times while the population increased two and one-half times.15
In 1977 the Army Corps of Engineers completed a study of water
supply in the Northeast (the NEWS Study). i6 Undertaken in response to
a severe drought in the Northeast during the 1960's, the study discusses
trends in water use and supply. Its projections pose real challenges for
the Northeastern states. The study found that sixty percent of the
Northeast's population of fifty million people live in five major metropol-
itan areas: Baltimore, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washing-
ton. 17 The study projects that by the year 2000, the region's population
will increase by thirty million, and that most people will continue to live
in these five metropolitan areas. 18 The study concludes that three of
these metropolitan areas-Boston, New York and Washington-already
have "immediate near term need (prior to 1990) for increased supply
capacity."19
The NEWS Study found that in these three metropolitan areas, the
demand for water after the mid-1960's drought exceeded the pre-drought
demand, thus widening existing deficits between "safe yields" 20 and ac-
tual consumption. 21 The study warned that the deficits would continue
to grow unless water supplies increased or, due to conservation and in-
creased prices, demand diminished. 22
The planning and implementation of major water supply projects
entail many years 23 and large amounts of capital, as two examples from
New York City show. The first example is a project to divert enough
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, HOUSATONIC RIVER BASIN URBAN STUDY A-56 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as HOUSATONIC STUDY].
15. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 6.
16. NEWS STUDY, supra note 1.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id. All of Rhode Island and almost all of Massachusetts have "immediate near term
need" for water. Within these two states, the Boston and Providence metropolitan areas have
the most urgent need. Id. at 63.
20. The "safe yield" is the maximum amount of water that could be withdrawn from a
water system daily over the course of a year, if the year's runoff feeding such a system were
equal to the amount of runoff in the lowest historically recorded year. M. GREENBERG & R.
HORDON, supra note 13, at 69-71; NEWS STUDY, supra note 1, at 14. After the sixties'
drought, the safe yields of most systems in the Northeast, Which had been based on the
drought of 1929-32, were reduced, some significantly. For example, New York City's safe
yield was reduced 29%. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 70-71.
21. NEWS STUDY, supra note 1, at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7, 9.
23. The average lead time for a new reservoir is between eight and ten years. Army
Corps of Engineers projects require an average of about 18 years from inception to completion.
M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 74; 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 273. The
NEWS Study estimates that the various projects proposed in the study would require 10 to 15
years for implementation. See NEWS STUDY, supra note 1, at 25, 70, for discussions of project
timing for both the Washington and Boston metropolitan areas.
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water from the Hudson River during high flows to add 360 million gal-
lons per day (mgd) annually to New York City's water supply system.
The need for an increase in the City's supply was first perceived during
the drought of the mid-1960's. The project proposal came out of the
NEWS Study, which was issued in 1977.24 The project is still awaiting
various federal approvals and final congressional authorization. It is esti-
mated that once the project is authorized, there will be six years of
preconstruction design and engineering planning, with construction com-
mencing two years thereafter and taking another six to eight years to
complete. 2 Thus, thirty years may elapse between the initial identifica-
tion of a problem and a finished project. The second example is the con-
struction of a third water tunnel as a backup to the City's existing
tunnels. Phase I of construction, which began in 1970, is expected to be
completed by 1988-90,26 while the completion dates for Phases II and III
have not been determined. Initial discussions for the third tunnel began
in 1954.27 The estimated total cost for the Hudson River project and
Phase I of the tunnel, in 1980 dollars, is $5.4 billion. 28
The New Jersey Statewide Water Supply Master Plan,29 (New Jersey
Master Plan) provides additional cost figures for typical water supply
facilities. The New Jersey Master Plan estimates that it will cost $65
million to build a pipeline that can move forty mgd twenty-six miles from
the Raritan River basin, in the state's central region, to the Passaic River
basin, in northeastern New Jersey. 30 Two reservoirs with a combined
yield of thirty-five mgd will cost an additional $40 million, 31 and another
$65 million will be needed for "high priority rehabilitation and consoli-
dation of inadequate water supply systems."' 32 New Jersey voters re-
cently approved a $350 million bond issue, of which $128.5 million is
slated just for various feasibility studies regarding projects commencing
after 1985.33
24. The Corps of Engineers has not been involved with any water supply projects for
New Jersey or Connecticut. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8. In New York, the state and
affected local governments decided to work with the Corps on the Hudson River project to
increase New York City's safe yield.
25. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 9, 16-17.
26. Water Supply Needs of the Northeastern United States, Hearing Before the Subcomtn.
on Water Resources of the House Comm on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st.
Sess. 250 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]; 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 517.
27. 1979 Hearings, supra note 26, at 250.
28. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 517.
29. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, Div. OF WATER RE-
SOURCES, THE NEW JERSEY STATEWIDE .WATER SUPPLY MASTER PLAN (1981) [hereinafter
cited as NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN].
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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C. Water Supply Systems
1. Development of Public Water Supply Systems: The Sources of
Fragmentation
Today only seventeen percent of all Americans rely for their home
uses on individual water supply systems, such as individual wells or di-
rect diversions of surface waters. 34 Public water supply systems 35 satisfy
the remaining eighty-three percent of residential demand and most of the
demand for water by nonindustrial commercial businesses and public
uses, such as fire protection. 36 Public water supply systems also supply
approximately twelve percent of the water needed by industrial
businesses.
37
Public water supply systems are a product of urbanization. In the
nineteenth century, most of the population living outside of the cities
depended on individual water systems. 38 In cities, however, the need for
clean and adequate water supplies for growing populations, coupled with
the need to provide greater community fire protection services, made reli-
ance on individual systems unviable. This led to the development, in the
first half of the nineteenth century, of more extensive water supply
systems.
39
In the early part of the nineteeth century, most cities relied on pri-
vate water companies. 40 In 1801, Philadelphia developed the first munic-
34. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 24. By the year 2000,
individual water systems will serve only about 10% of the population.
35. The term "public water supply systems" refers to all community water supply sys-
tems and includes systems owned by private companies as well as those owned by government
entities. Privately owned water supply systems are called "investor-owned systems."
36. Water withdrawals fall into four principle uses: agriculture, industrial, steam-electric
generation, and domestic (i.e., municipal, individual, and commercial withdrawals). With-
drawals for domestic use have traditionally been less than for the other three uses and have
represented about 8.5% of total freshwater withdrawals. Domestic use grew, however, as a
result of population growth and increased per capita income, from five billion gallons per day
(bgd) in 1900 to 29 bgd in 1975. Of the 29 bgd, 23 bgd were for municipal and individual uses,
and 5.5 bgd were for commercial uses. Wolman, The Metabolism of Cities, in WATER,
HEALTH, AND SOCIETY 281 (G. White ed. 1969); SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT,
supra note 2, at 20-21.
37. In 1975, manufacturing received 7.3 bgd, or 11.8% of its total water withdrawals,
from public water supply systems. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at
37.
38. "At the close of the eighteenth century, only seventeen utilities were in operation.
The number did not pass the hundred mark until 1850 and the thousand mark until 1895. By
1895 the number had reached about 3,000." Wolman & Bosch, U.S. Water Supply Lessons
Applicable to Developing Countries, in WATER, HEALTH AND SOCIETY 219-20 (G. White ed.
1969). By 1900 public water supply systems served 39% of the population, a figure which
corresponds with the percentage of the population then living in urban areas. M. GREENBERG
& R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 25.
39. N. BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CrIES 5-21 (1956).
40. Id. at 63.
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ipally-owned water supply system. 41 By the mid-nineteeth century,
reliance on private water companies gave way, in the larger cities, to mu-
nicipally-owned systems. As noted by Nicholas Blake, a historian of
water supply in the United States, "[e]verywhere the high rates and inad-
equate service of the private companies were contrasted with the lower
rates and larger supply provided by Philadelphia's pioneer venture in
municipal water works."'42 Today, almost three-fourths of all urban
water systems (those servicing 50,000 or more customers) are munici-
pally-owned. 43
Rapid development of public water supply systems occurred in the
first two decades of the twentieth century as a part of the process of
suburbanization of the areas surrounding cities.44 By 1976, some 35,000
public water supply systems operated in the United States. Of these,
eighty percent served less than 10,000 customers each, supplying a total
of only nine percent of public system users. Twenty percent of the sys-
tems served the remaining ninety-one percent of public users.45
The most telling feature of water supply sybstems throughout the
United States is the fragmentation along local political boundaries. Pro-
vision of water has always been a function of local government that has
been performed either by municipalities themselves or by private compa-
nies operating under direct or indirect municipal franchises. 46
41. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 77.
43. THE PRESIDENT'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL WATER POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT
OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON URBAN WATER SUPPLY II-I (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT].
44. Three thousand public water supply systems existed in 1895; by 1924, that number
had tripled to 9000 systems serving 10,000 communities. Wolman & Bosch, supra note 38, at
220. See also J. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF MET-
ROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850-1970 76-104 (1979), for a discussion of the development of public
services such as water supply in suburban areas. In describing the trend toward suburban self-
reliance, Teaford cites the example of Cook County, Illinois, where in 1880 only "29% of the
outlying municipalities .. . enjoyed a piped supply of water, whereas by 1915 45% of the
suburban cities and villages could claim this advantage. And by 1934 83% of the municipali-
ties within a fifty mile radius of Chicago enjoyed a public water supply." Id. at 78.
The widespread delivery of public services by private companies during this period, and
the failure of municipal regulation to ensure reasonable rates for customers and stockholders
alike, generated a demand for state regulation of investor-owned utilities. 1 H. SPURR, GUID-
ING PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATION 2-7 (1924); P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY,
PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 28-31 (1964). The decade between 1907 and 1917 witnessed the
creation, in "all but a minority" of states, of public utility commissions to issue franchises and
regulate water rates. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 27 (1969).
45. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER SUPPLY, SURVEY OF
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY WATER SYSTEMS 11-3 to II-
4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EPA SURVEY].
46. Although they are issued by the state, franchises for investor-owned systems gener-
ally require formal or informal approval by the municipalities to be served. Under New York
law, for example, affected municipalities must consent to the incorporation of any private wa-
terworks corporation. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 1983).
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In the Northeast, most public water supply systems initially have
used water from within local borders.47 Typically, they use groundwater,
which generally is less expensive and easier to provide than surface
water. 48 The natural inclination to look first to water sources close at
hand, however, cannot explain why most communities have chosen to
create their own water systems. The development and endurance of frag-
mented water systems reflect a strong tradition of local autonomy.49
Municipalities generally try to avoid becoming dependent for direct ser-
vice on neighboring supply systems. Instead, each municipality almost
always either establishes its own system or franchises an investor-owned
system. This pattern persists even where the local water system must
purchase Water from other, nonlocal water systems.5O When municipali-
ties outgrow their indigenous natural supply, they are more likely to buy
47. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 37; Miri, Some Problems of Water
Resource Management in Virginia: A Preliminary Examination, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
388, 415-16 (1971).
48. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 110. Individual and small public
water supply systems generally use groundwater, while larger water systems, serving more
densely populated areas, use surface water. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at 11-10 to 11-12, and
IV- 1 to IV-12. Although 75% of all systems use groundwater, these systems serve only 29%
of the population. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 24.
The preference for groundwater may also reflect the more relaxed rules that govern the
allocation of groundwater rights, compared with those that govern the use of surface water.
49. In 1976, there were an estimated 35,000 public water supply systems in the United
States. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at 11-3. The 1982 census figures show that there are
19,083 municipalities, 3041 counties, and 16,748 townships in this country. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL UNITS IN 1982, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT No. 1, at 1 (1982). Thus, even assuming that the number of water supply
systems has not increased since 1976 (which is unlikely), there would be one water system for
nearly every general local governmental unit in the United States.
Fragmentation is a key institutional problem in water delivery. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WATER
SUPPLY AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 21-23 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
ACIR REPORT]. Fragmentation exists throughout the nation, but is especially acute in subur-
ban areas. Id. at 16, 21. Other studies of water supply distribution in the Northeast have
confirmed the ACIR Report's conclusions. See M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13,
at 14-15 (analysis of northeastern New Jersey water supply distribution); TEMPORARY
COMM'N ON THE WATER SUPPLY NEEDS OF SOUTHEASTERN NEW YORK, INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 153-54, 187, 189-90 (1973); 1 INST. OF PUB-
LIC ADMIN., ORGANIZATIONAL, LEGAL AND PUBLIC FINANCE ASPECTS OF REGIONAL
WATER SUPPLY 14, 89 (1972) (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island); E. KAYNOR & I. HOWARDS, ATTITUDES, VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS IN
WATER RESOURCE DECISIONMAKING WITHIN A METROPOLITAN AREA 40, 91 (1973)
(Springfield, Massachusetts metropolitan area).
In his study of northern New Jersey, Professor Miri found a "strong attachment to local
autonomy." J. MIRI, THE POLITICS OF WATER SUPPLY IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY 17
(1971). Similarly, the Corps of Engineers notes that the strength of home rule in Connecticut
and Massachusetts limited the potential alternatives with respect to planned regional water
supply projects. HOUSATONIC STUDY, supra note 14, at B-35.
50. J. MIRI, supra note 49, at 26. A study of the Springfield, Massachusetts metropolitan
area found "town after town seek[ing] self-contained alternatives to water resource problems."
E. KAYNOR & I. HOWARDS, supra note 49, at 42.
1985]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
additional water from other sources than to merge or consolidate with
other nearby municipal systems.51
Suburban communities, even when aware of a water supply prob-
lem, have been more reluctant than their city counterparts to seek metro-
politan or regional solutions. This reluctance reflects a continuing
distrust of cities that have larger and more centralized systems.5 2 Frag-
mentation is also explained in part by general public apathy. Except dur-
ing times of drought, most voters take little interest in water supply
problems. Thus local officials, who have a natural preference for auton-
omy, feel little pressure to join in cooperative intergovernmental
programs. 53
2. The Different Legal and Political Environments in Which the
Different Forms of Water Systems Operate
The effects of the fragmentation of water supply distribution systems
are often accentuated by the co-existence within a single state of three
types of systems: municipally-owned systems, investor-owned systems,
and special districts and authorities (which have characteristics of each
of the other two forms of ownership). These three types of institutions
operate in different legal and political environments. This results in dif-
ferences in their decisionmaking patterns concerning the development
and operation of supply facilities, which in turn makes cooperation
among them more difficult.
a. Municipal Water Systems
Municipally-owned water supply systems are more common than
investor-owned water companies. 54 Two possible reasons for this are the
capital-intensive nature of water supply systems"5 and the general per-
51. See M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 111-13.
52. E. KAYNOR & I. HOWARDS, supra note 49, at 42; ACIR REPORT, supra note 49, at
50-51.
53. The Springfield, Massachusetts study found that even among involved local officials
and citizens there was little interest in "large scale water resource plans and programs." E.
KAYNOR & I. HOWARDS, supra note 49, at 91. "When asked to rank local issues, most re-
spondents placed water resources near the bottom." Id. at 43.
54. Investor-owned systems predominate in only two of the twelve Northeastern states:
Connecticut has 61 municipally-owned systems and 524 investor-owned systems; Virginia has
365 municipally-owned systems and 3306 investor-owned systems. Data from the Connecticut
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Natural Resources Center, supplied to the author (July 1982);
letter from Evans H. Massic, Enforcement Chief, Bureau of Water Supply Engineering, Com-
monwealth of Virginia Dep't of Health, to the author (Nov. 12, 1982).
55. According to Professor Blake, the early development of municipally-owned systems
was due in part to the inability of private companies to raise sufficient capital to maintain and
expand their systems. N. BLAKE, supra note 39, at 77. This may have been the case in the
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, when financial markets had not developed ade-
quately. The capital intensive nature of the water supply industry does not explain the small
role played by investor-owned systems formed in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
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ception of water as a public resource intimately tied to the public health
and the economic well-being of a community. Property tax advantages
also favor municipal over private ownership, especially with larger sys-
tems whose surface water diversions require substantial land holdings.
Most states exempt municipally-owned water supply systems from
state regulation.5 6 Six of the twelve Northeastern states do not regulate
either the rates or the services of municipally-owned systems.5 7 Four
states regulate only the rates charged to extraterritorial customers (peo-
ple living outside municipal borders). 58 The other two states, Maine and
Rhode Island, provide for some degree of intramunicipal rate regulation.
Until 1981, Maine regulated the rates of municipally-owned systems as a
matter of course. 59 Maine now permits municipally-owned systems to
set their own rates, with review by the state Public Utility Commission
available only upon petition. 6° In 1980, Rhode Island amended its stat-
utes to provide for the regulation of intramunicipal rates; however, the
law covers only those systems that also provide extraterritorial service. 61
however, when other more capital intensive utilities (e.g., telephone and electric) were domi-
nated by private companies.
56. Each state, however, does regulate the purity of water supplies. Both municipally-
owned systems and investor-owned systems must report to the state agency (typically the De-
partment of Health) charged with insuring the quality of drinking water, a regulatory task
which requires the enforcement of federal standards under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1982). The information that municipalities provide generally pertains
to the quality, not the quantity, of water supplies. In some instances, though, the two issues
may overlap, as where a system's financial inability to maintain quality standards affects its
ability to provide water at all.
57. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, and
Virginia.
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 55 (1983) (upon "written application of any county, sani-
tary district or municipal corporation" being supplied by another county or municipal corpo-
ration); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:12 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:62-85.2 (West Supp.
1984-1985); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Purdon 1979).
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 69 (1978).
60. Under the amended law, municipalities may request the Maine Public Utility Com-
mission to hold hearings on the proposed changes. Alternatively, the municipality may hold
local hearings that are subject to Commission review upon the petition of either 15% of the
system's customers or 1000 customers, whichever is less. 1981 Me. Laws 438, §§ 3-5. Con-
necticut and Maryland require municipalities to conduct public hearings on proposed rate
changes, but do not provide for state review. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-239 (West 1972);
MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-727 (1982).
61. 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 335, § 6 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-2 (1983)). Since
1967, Rhode Island has regulated the extraterritorial rates of municipally-owned systems, as
well as their intramunicipal rates, when the systems received either water or loans from the
Rhode Island Water Resources Board. In 1980, the state legislature amended the provisions
affecting extraterritorial rates. The amendments came in response to a judicial decision involv-
ing the state's largest municipally-owned system, the City of Providence Water Supply Board,
which serves 13 communities where 55% of the state's population reside. In City of Provi-
dence v. Public Util. Comm'n, 414 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1980), the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the Providence system could set extraterritorial rates without state review. The court
relied on the fact that the statute that enabled the municipal system to fix rates was enacted
subsequent to the passage of the statute that empowered the state to review extraterritorial
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A few Northeastern states involve their public utility commissions
in the affairs of municipally-owned systems in ways other than rate regu-
lation. In Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania, municipally-
owned systems are subject to the reporting requirements of each state's
public utility commission, although neither Connecticut nor New York
regulate any municipal water rates, and Pennsylvania only regulates ex-
traterritorial rates. 62 In New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, pro-
posed municipal system contracts to buy or sell water must be approved
by the state agency in charge of water resources management. 63
A number of states regulate competition between municipally-
owned and investor-owned systems by prohibiting municipal service in
areas where other systems exist or by requiring the acquisition of any
private systems before extending service into such areas. 64 Similarly, two
municipal rates. The court's decision prompted the legislature to amend the latter statute
explicitly to grant the state the power to review all extraterritorial municipal rates, including
those of the Providence system.
The statewide regulatory approach has presented some new challenges. An official at the
Rhode Island Water Resources Board reported that the agency encountered problems in devel-
oping uniform and fair rate regulation principles applicable to both municipally-owned and
investor-owned systems. One area of contention has been the question of how to treat the
municipal practice of borrowing from general funds to pay for utility deficits. The state favors
an approach that would disallow municipally-owned systems, in calculating their expenses for
ratemaking purposes, from including the costs of repaying such loans. This policy would force
municipally-owned systems to become self-supporting. Telephone interview with Peter Calise,
Staff Director, Rhode Island Water Resources Board (Aug. 2, 1983). See infra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the practice of municipal interlocking finances.
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-239, 16-19, 16-29 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. PuB.
SERV. LAW § 89(1) (Mckinney 1955); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 66, §§ 1701, 1703, 1706 (Purdon
1979). Connecticut requires municipally-owned systems to file annual reports as specified by
the state's Public Utility Control Commission. A state official complained that municipalities
often failed to comply with filing requirements and to employ specified uniform accounting
standards. Interview with Peter Kosak, Associate Utilities Engineer, Engineering Division,
Connecticut Dep't of Public Utility Control (July 16, 1982).
In New York, municipally-owned systems must file copies of their annual reports with the
Public Service Commission. Most municipalities, however, do not comply with this require-
ment. Keig, Fristoe & Goddard, State Regulation of Water Utilities, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug.
13, 1970, at 21; telephone interviews with officials at the New York Public Service Comm'n
(Aug. 3, 1983). Pennsylvania requires all municipally-owned systems to maintain depreciation
accounts and reports as prescribed by the Public Utilities Commission, and to make their
facilities and records available for inspection. Connecticut and Pennsylvania also prescribe
uniform accounting principles to be used by all systems. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-29
(West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1701, 1703, 1706 (Purdon 1979).
63. New York and Rhode Island administer permit systems for the allocation of water
for public use. Under both states' systems, the state must approve all contracts for the
purchase of water. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1501 (McKinney Supp. 1984); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 46-15-7(1), (6) (Supp. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 248-59, for a
general discussion of New York's permit system. Rhode Island's statutory scheme is virtually
identical to New York's. In New Jersey, the Department of Environmental Protection must
approve all proposed contracts for the sale of water from municipally-owned systems to other
municipalities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-84 (West Supp. 1984).
64. For example, Massachusetts requires a municipality seeking to set up its own water-
works system to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, any existing system already serving
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Northeastern states prevent competition between municipally-owned sys-
tems by prohibiting one municipality from serving customers in another
municipality without the other municipality's prior consent. 65 In no
state can municipalities be ordered to provide extraterritorial service. 66
With the recent exception of New Jersey, no state can order municipali-
ties to interconnect with other systems, except during declared
emergencies. 67
In addition to the "hands oft" approach generally taken by states
with respect to municipally-owned systems, there are other differences in
the legal and political environments in which municipally-owned and in-
vestor-owned systems operate. Municipally-owned systems benefit from
significant tax advantages which are not available to private systems.
Municipally-owned systems pay neither income taxes on revenues nor
property taxes on property within municipal borders' 68 In five North-
eastern states, municipally-owned systems pay no taxes on extraterrito-
the municipality. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 39A (West 1975). In Connecticut, a
municipality cannot establish its own system unless the existing investor-owned system, if any,
agrees to sell its assets to the municipality. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-234 (West 1972).
Delaware and Pennsylvania prohibit the creation of water supply authorities that will compete
with or duplicate existing systems. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 1407 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 306(A) (Purdon 1984). Maryland allows municipal water systems to compete with
investor-owned systems only if the municipalities determine that the private systems are "un-
fit" for incorporation into the municipal systems. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-
707(c) (1982).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:62-83, -85 (West 1967); VA. CODE § 15.1-334 (1981).
66. Since they are public utilities, municipally-owned water systems have a duty to ser-
vice the public. Consequently, the case law has qualified the general prohibition against state-
ordered extraterritorial service so that it accords with principles applicable to public utilities.
Thus, if a municipally-owned system chooses to extend service to nonresidents, it cannot dis-
criminate among similarly situated nonresidents. In addition, a municipally-owned system,
upon acquiring an investor-owned system, cannot cut off service to any of the company's ex-
tramunicipal customers.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 220-21 for a discussion of the 1981 New Jersey law
that authorizes the state's Department of Environmental Protection to order inteOrconnections
among systems. In 1982, Connecticut passed similar legislation, permitting the state's Depart-
ment of Public Utility Control to order investor-owned systems to interconnect with other
systems, including municipally-owned systems, when spot shortages occur. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 16-262k (West Supp. 1984). Virginia's State Corporation Commission can or-
der one public utility to transfer water to another public utility whenever "public health,
wealth and safety shall so require." VA. CODE § 56-249.1 (1981). Under the Virginia statute,
however, the term "public utility" does not include municipal corporations. Id. § 56-1.
68. Many of these systems, however, do make payments in lieu of taxes. The EPA Survey
revealed a direct correlation between the size of a municipally-owned system and the likeli-
hood that such a system makes payments in lieu of taxes:
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rial property; 69 in another five Northeastern states, such entities pay real
estate taxes on land, but not on improvements. 70 In addition, the
favorable federal tax treatment of interest earned on municipal bonds
allows municipally-owned systems to finance capital improvements at
lower rates than private systems. 7 1
States generally exempt water supply projects from state limits on
municipal debt, 72 although two states, New Jersey and Virginia, offer ex-
emptions only for "self-liquidating" debt. 73 On the other hand, certain
Percent Making Payments
Size (population served) in Lieu of Taxes
25-99 0
100-499 12
500-999 8
1000-2499 7
2500-4999 18
5000-9999 20
10,000-99,999 31
100,000-999,999 39
1 million and over 40
EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at VII-14.
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4262 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4262 (1978);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, § 9(b) (1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a)(7) (Purdon
Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 58:1-3663 (1984). In Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Vir-
ginia, tax exemptions on extraterritorial property derive from general real property tax exemp-
tions granted to public property used for public purposes. The Maine statute specifically
exempts "revenue producing municipal facilities" located "within or without the corporate
limits." In Virginia, a municipal system's facilities that are located outside its borders are
exempt from real property taxes as long as the system provides no extramunicipal service.
(The use of waterworks to generate revenue outside municipal borders is not deemed a public
use of municipal property.)
70. Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire require payments in lieu of taxes in
amounts equal to taxes based on the average of the assessed value of the land for the preceding
three years. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 5D (West Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 72.11 (Supp. 1983). New Jersey taxes land only. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.3 (West
Supp. 1984-1985). Vermont allows taxation of land, plus a tax on 75% of the land value in
lieu of the personal property tax. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3659 (1981). Connecticut exempts
all property located outside a municipality's borders, as long as the taxing jurisdiction can
obtain water from the supplier municipality. Otherwise the land, but not the facilities, is taxed
at rates applicable to farm land. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-76(a) (West 1983).
71. The water supply industry relies more heavily on long-term debt financing than other
capital-intensive industries. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at VII-20; Garfield, Earnings Re-
quired to Finance Water Company Expansion, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 15, 1968, at 27-29.
Interest expense generally constitutes approximately 20% of total revenues for all public water
systems. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at VII-20. For larger systems (serving 100,000 persons
or more), the lower interest rates can save municipally-owned systems as much as two to three
cents per thousand gallons of water. Id. at VII-21.
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-374(b)(i) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 22, § 106(a)(1) (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 44, § 8(3) (West Supp. 1984).
73. "Self-liquidating" debt is analogous to "revenue bonds" because the cash revenues
from the project to which the debt applies are intended to cover operating and maintenance
costs, interest expense and principal repayments. In New Jersey, for the purpose of calculating
its municipal debt limit, any revenue deficits for the payments of interest and principal on a
"self-liquidating" debt is included in the municipality's gross debt. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40A:2-6, -44, -45, -48 (West 1980). Virginia's Constitution provides that if, after a period
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aspects of state regulation of municipal bond financing, such as the need
in many cases for bond referenda and public issuance of bonds, and limi-
tations on the use of revenue bonds, serve to restrict the financing options
available to municipal systems in comparison to other institutions.
Municipalities generally are able to use revenues from water sales
for other municipal purposes. 74 Some observers suggest that even where
the law requires municipalities to keep the revenues of their water supply
systems separate from general funds, in practice surplus water revenues
are often "siphoned off" into the general treasury. 75
The water rates of municipally-owned systems are generally lower
than those of investor-owned systems. 76 Many factors contribute to this
price differential. First, municipalities enjoy both lower borrowing costs
and lesser tax burdens. 77 In addition, the opposition of consumers to rate
not exceeding five years, a system's revenues cannot cover costs of operation, including interest
expense, sinking fund payments, and insurance, the amount of principal on all of its outstand-
ing debt must be included in calculating the municipal debt for debt limitation purposes. VA.
CONsT. art. VII, § 10(a)(2).
74. Only four Northeastern states limit the use of revenues derived from water sales.
Connecticut prohibits any use of waterworks revenues for other municipal purposes. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-204 (West 1972). Vermont prohibits use of waterworks revenues for
other municipal purposes whenever water supply bonds are outstanding. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 3311 (1975). Massachusetts allows four uses of revenues from water sales: operating
expenses, interest and principal payments, reimbursements to towns for money spent on their
water departments, and new construction. Any remaining surplus must be used to reduce
rates. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 69B (West Supp. 1984). The rates set by Maine's
municipalities must cover the following expenses: payments for operating and maintaining the
system, payments for interest, principal, and sinking fund requirements of not less than two
percent nor more than 10% of outstanding indebtedness, and payment of up to five percent of
yearly revenues into a contingency reserve fund. 1981 Me. Laws 438, §5.
75. Interview with Peter Kosak, supra note 62. In a 1968 survey of 252 municipally-
owned water utilities serving 10,000 customers or more, officials expressed dissatisfaction over
the "provision of free water service to other departments, the contributions to general revenue
funds and the failure of the city council to permit the water department to operate as a utility."
Keig, Fristoe, & Goddard, Structure of Publicly-Owned Water Utilities, J. OF AM. WATER-
WORKS, Apr. 1970, at 215, 218 [hereinafter cited as Keig].
A statistical analysis of 337 municipally-owned systems (using 1964 data), conducted to
"examine the linkage between utility prices and variables in municipal finance," revealed
"clear evidence of a trade-off between [municipally-owned utility] prices and local taxes ...
Overall, the evidence indicates that water consumers subsidize municipal operations in more
cases than those in which the municipality subsidizes water uses." P. Mann, The Interlocking
of Municipalities and Publicly Owned Utilities, in LOCAL SERVICE PRICING POLICIES AND
THEIR EFFECT ON URBAN SPATIAL STRUCTURE 300-01 (P. Downing ed. 1974). See infra
note 78 for further discussion of the effects that local political pressures have on the financial
operations of municipally-owned water supply systems.
76. Compared with investor-owned systems, municipal systems "in all size categories"
consistently sold water at lower rates per thousand gallons of water. EPA SURVEY, supra note
45, at VI-12. An earlier study also found that the "prices charged by privately owned systems
[were] . . . systematically higher" than the prices charged by municipal systems. J. HIRSH-
LEIFER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY-ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND
POLICY 107 (1960) [hereinafter cited as J. HIRSHLEIFER].
77. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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increases 78 often motivates municipalities to subsidize water system defi-
cits with property tax revenues. The tendency in such situations is to
provide just enough money to permit continued operation, but not
enough to cover the costs of new investments.
Municipally-owned systems often suffer from inadequate water sup-
plies because they typically neither reinvest surplus funds, when rates are
high enough to yield surpluses, nor raise additional capital through rate
increases when deficits occur. For these same reasons, municipally-
owned systems also tend to maintain their infrastructure inadequately.
This is particularly true in the older municipal systems where leakage in
some instances wastes thirty percent or more of the daily water supply,
making shortfalls during droughts even more likely. 79
In 1980, a presidential task force estimated that "municipally-owned
and operated urban water systems are four times as likely as privately-
owned systems to experience shortfalls" in supply.80 Yet despite the ur-
gency of the situation faced by many systems, the popular notion that
water should be free, or as nearly free as possible, is pervasive and diffi-
cult to overcome. Many observers suggest that the public's lack of inter-
est in water supply problems is a principal reason why municipalities
have made capital investments in water supply a relatively low priority. 81
78. A 1980 survey found that "local officials have argued that raising water prices to the
levels needed. . . is not feasible politically." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
43, at 111-2. The report cites a number of possible explanations for voter resistance to in-
creased rates: (1) the "desire of some voters to have others pay a portion of their costs;" (2)
voter skepticism of "bureaucratic proposals;" (3) the lack of visibility of capital improvements
to water supply systems; and (4) a fear that higher rates might overburden low-income fami-
lies, and might cause businesses and high income residents to leave the area. Id. at 111-3.
Water supply officials usually emphasize the last two explanations. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings,
supra note 26, at 122-28, in which Buffalo city officials testified that $500 million was needed to
"bring [the] system to a decent operating level," but that the city could not raise water rates
for fear of losing more residents, given New York's already high tax structure. The officials
also expressed concern about increasing the burden on people with fixed incomes. The officials
added that the then current rates, which averaged $75-$80 per year for a single family home,
had not been raised in four years. Id. at 125-26.
79. The Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, Robert Flacke, has testified that several cities in New York, such as Albany, Rochester,
and Poughkeepsie, lose between 30-60% of their daily water supplies to leakage. 1979 Hear-
ings, supra note 26, at 174; 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 405. New York City estimates that
it loses 100 million gallons per day, which is seven percent of its daily supply. Id. On an
average day in 1980, Philadelphia could not account for 118 million gallons of water (about
33% of the system's daily supply); 66 million of these gallons were lost to leakage. Id. at 775.
During the 1980-81 water shortage, the Connecticut-American Water Company, serving the
Town of Greenwich, could not account for about 19% of its daily water supply. State of
Connecticut Dep't of Public of Utility Control, Decision with Respect to Application of the
Connecticut-American Water Company to Increase its Rates to All Customers, docket no. 81-
10-03, at 16 (May 20, 1982).
80. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 111-2.
81. Id. at 111-3; Keig, supra note 75, at 219.
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b. Investor-Owned Systems
Investor-owned systems are subject to rate regulation and to income
and property taxation. In addition, they borrow money at higher rates
than municipal systems. Privately-owned systems, however, are un-
hampered by bond referendum requirements, debt limits, and other simi-
lar restrictions. Thus, when they need capital for improvements, private
systems can be more flexible than municipal systems, with respect to tim-
ing and loan size.
The way in which public utility commissions set water rates signifi-
cantly affects the investment decisions of private systems. Commissions
typically set the water rate at the level necessary to meet a target rate of
return on the system's equity, which is related to the value of its capital
assets. This method of setting rates creates an incentive for private sys-
tems to plow earnings back into new investments. In contrast, ratepayers
pressure municipal water systems either to divert their surpluses to other
non-water-related uses or to reduce water rates.
To protect ratepayers against unnecessary investments, state laws
generally restrict the ability of private systems to include in their rate
bases the cost of investments for future use.8 2 Limitations on the ability
of investor-owned utilities to recoup these costs may skew investment
toward smaller storage capacity units which take less time to complete.83
In contrast, for municipal systems which are not restricted in this man-
ner, once a decision has been made to proceed with a bond referendum
and public offering, there may be pressure to overbuild to avoid having to
return to voters for additional bond issues. 84
When examining the role of investor-owned systems in the water
supply distribution network, a clear distinction emerges between large
and small systems. Although the number of investor-owned water sup-
ply systems is roughly equivalent to the number of municipally-owned
systems,8 5 investor-owned systems serve only sixteen percent of the na-
82. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 174-81 (1969).
83. See 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 756-69 (1969) for a
discussion of the conflict between the regulatory practice of excluding investments for future
use from the rate base and the need for water companies to purchase land and construct reser-
voirs to meet future demand.
84. It has been suggested that the pursuit of power and glory by bureaucrats and politi-
cians, as well as their failure to properly calculate the cost of investments, substantially con-
tribute to the tendency of governments to over-invest in water supply facilities. J.
HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 76, at 369-71. The political hurdles associated with making new
capital investments may also contribute to this bias.
85. In 1975, it was reported that investor-owned systems constituted 52% of all public
water systems. SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 22-23. The term
"public water system" is defined in the Safe Drinking Water Act to include all systems which
serve 25 or more people or which have 15 or more service connections. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4)
(1982). Using data supplied pursuant to the Act, EPA found that 44% of the nation's public
water systems were investor-owned. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at 11-5.
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tion's population.8 6 Most investor-owned systems are small and serve
only single communities.8 7 In Pennsylvania, for example, seventy-three
percent of the investor-owned systems serve less than 500 customers
each. 88 Such small operations generally lack access to the capital neces-
sary to upgrade their facilities to meet increasing consumer demand and
to comply with the standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 89 In con-
trast, larger investor-owned systems have been more successful in raising
the capital necessary to maintain adequate supplies and services. 90
There have been increasing failures among small water companies in
New York, with the affected municipalities taking over the failed sys-
86. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at II-5.
87. Sample data show that a majority of systems serving fewer than 500 people are inves-
tor-owned, whereas 80% of the systems serving greater than 500 people are municipally-
owned. EPA Survey, supra note 45, at IV-3.
88. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 682.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1982). In 1981, while commenting on the fact that 70%
of the 1250 water supply systems in Pennsylvania served less than 1000 customers, the Associ-
ate Deputy Secretary for Resources Management and Drought Coordination for the State of
Pennsylvania testified that:
Most small suppliers lack the technical personnel and fiscal and organizational re-
sources to meet basic standards. Their small rate base does not bode well for their
ability to raise needed funds through traditional financing mechanisms, including
bank loans and sales of bonds on the open market. Faced with small numbers of
customers, unrealistically low rates, and inadequate cash flow, many systems are
barely able to meet current expenses; no reserves are available for maintenance and
replacement of the basic system. Insolvency and bankruptcy of small suppliers is no
longer unknown. If a water supply company goes bankrupt, quite often the only
available option is the formation of a municipal authority to take over the system.
Unfortunately, such authorities may not be in financial position to solve the underly-
ing problems.
1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 721. See also NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at
25:
Investor-owned utilities fall into two groups: one representing the larger, established,
well-managed and well-financed utilities; and the other representing the small utili-
ties, many of which are under-managed, under-operated and under-financed. The
larger investor-owned utility represents a major contribution to good water service in
New Jersey. These utilities are among the best operated and maintained in the State.
Small investor-owned utilities, however, are a serious concern in many rural and
suburban communities. Most of the small investor-owned utilities are a fall-out of
land development where franchises were granted by a community and the system
recognized by the State. Without borrowing capacity for improvements, or the or-
ganization and funds to cope with the rate-making process, these small systems have
been a trial for regulatory agencies and a frustration to their customers and local
governments.
In 1977, to facilitate local compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act, Connecticut
instituted a program that offered financial help to local water supply systems. The program
provided $4 million in loans to investor-owned systems serving between 25 and 10,000 persons.
It also made $3 million in grants available to municipally-owned systems. 1977 Conn. Acts
614, § 587 (Reg. Sess.). The state subsequently increased funding to a total of $9 million: $5
million for loans to investor-owned systems, and $4 million for grants to municipally-owned
systems. 1981 Conn. Acts 370, § 7 (Reg. Sess.). In 1982 the state expanded the program,
making loans and grants available to systems that had been ordered by the Department of
Health Services to remedy problems of inadequate supply. 1982 Conn. Acts 735, § I (Reg.
Sess.).
90. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 43, at 111-2 to 111-3.
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tems. 91 There is evidence that this phenomenon may be occurring in
other states as well. 92 Not all municipal takeovers, however, involve
small or failing systems. In August 1980, for example, the profitable
New Haven Water Company, which served Connecticut's New Haven
metropolitan area, sold its system to a public authority. The reasons for
the sale were related primarily to the lower financing costs93 enjoyed by a
quasi-municipal entity and the desire of the shareholders to maximize
their profits on the sale of large land holdings no longer needed by the
utility. Without the sale of the company as a whole, most of the profits
from individual sales of land would have been returned to the ratepayers
rather than the shareholders. 9
4
c. Special Districts and Public Authorities
Special districts and public authorities9 5 theoretically enjoy the best
of two worlds. As quasi-municipal entities, they receive favorable tax
treatment. Almost all states exempt these systems' property, wherever
located, from taxation.96 As semi-autonomous public bodies, they can
91.. Interview with Stuart M. Dean, Chief Permit Administrator for Water Supply, Bu-
reau of Water Resources, New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation (Oct. 18, 1982).
92. A recent survey of the 45 state commissions that regulate water supply utilities found
a "pervasive belief that many [such utilities] are simply too small to function efficiently as
public utilities." NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., COMMISSION REGULATION OF
SMALL WATER UTILITIES: SOME ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 26 (1983).
93. The public authority's lower financing costs reflect both its lower borrowing rate and
its ability to debt finance the entire cost of improvements. The latter advantage allows the
public authority to avoid having to use costly equity financing as a means of maintaining
acceptable debt to equity ratios. Telephone interview with Robert McQugh, Executive Direc-
tor, South Central Regional Water Authority (successor to the New Haven Water Company)
(Aug. 1, 1983).
94. The New Haven Water Company faced large costs to construct facilities to satisfy the
Safe Drinking Water Act's standards. At the same time, the company sought to sell some of
its large holdings of watershed land no longer needed with the construction and operation of
the treatment plants. The company, however, was uncertain whether all or any of the sale
proceeds would go to shareholders as opposed to ratepayers. The municipalities served by the
New Haven Water Company, on the other hand, feared that the company's sale of these lands
could lead to unwanted development. This combination of factors created a willing seller and
a willing buyer of the company's assets. Id.
95. Special districts are governmental units formed to perform either a single or a limited
number of governmental functions for a particular geographical area. They are the most nu-
merous form of local government. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERN-
MENTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT No. 1, GOVERNMENTAL UNITS IN 1982 1 (1982). The
Bureau of the Census classifies "public authorities" as "special districts."
As a general matter, public authorities tend to rely solely on user fees rather than tax
revenu& to pay operating costs. Members of the governing boards of public authorities are
usually appointed rather than elected, and their jurisdiction and constituencies tend to be flexi-
ble. In contrast, special districts may have the power to tax, their governing boards are often
elected, and they serve specific geographical areas. D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SAL-
SICH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 26 (2d ed. 1983); 0.
REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 11, 13 (1982).
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1410 (1983); MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN.
§ 9-608 (1982); VA. CODE § 15.1-1258 (1981).
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manage their affairs more efficiently and with less red tape than most
government agencies. Each state surveyed here has authorized the crea-
tion of either water supply districts, water supply authorities, or, in many
cases, both. 97
Quasi-municipal entities also offer the advantage of structural flexi-
bility, since jurisdictional lines can be drawn to reflect regional, rather
than local, needs. 98 Most of the quasi-municipal water supply systems,
however, have been limited to serving areas no larger than individual
counties99 or metropolitan areas. 0o
II
CASE STUDIES
The array of decisions that in the aggregate ultimately determine the
supply of water to each resident of a state occurs within a complex legal
structure involving the mandates of several regulatory agencies as well as
traditional property rights relating to the allocation of water. This sec-
tion contains case studies of how, in three representative states, Connect-
icut, New Jersey and New York, these legal structures led to the 1980-81
crisis and how these structures have been altered in response to that cri-
sis. To provide background, this section begins with a brief history of the
allocation of water rights in the Northeastern states and a description of
the 1980-81 crisis in the these three states.
97. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1410 (1983); MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN.
§ 9-601 to -611 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 5103(6) (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40.62-96 (West 1967); VA. CODE § 15.1-1258 (1981).
98. In six states, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
any municipality may establish its own water supply authority (or a "district," in Maine and
New Jersey) or may join with others to form a joint water supply authority (or district). DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1401-1402 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 5103 (1964); MD.
HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-902 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-96 (West 1967); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Purdon 1974); VA. CODE § 15.1-1241 (1981). In Delaware, Mary-
land, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the term "municipality" is used broadly to include local
government units such as counties, towns, and boroughs, in addition to incorporated cities and
villages.
A majority of Maine's water supply systems are run by water supply districts, whose
customers number from as few as 24 persons to as many as 40,370. Letter from the State of
Maine Public Utility Commission to the author (Oct. 1982). Maine law blurs the line between
municipalities and their water districts: where the two entities' boundaries coincide, munici-
palities can appropriate money for the districts. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 5103(b)
(1964).
99. Counties, unlike municipalities, tend not to own their own water supply systems. If
water is to be provided on a county-wide basis, it will be through a special districl or an
authority.
100. The New Jersey District Water Supply Commission is an exception to this pattern;
serving twelve counties, it is a large supplier of water to Northeastern New Jersey. Municipal
membership in the District is voluntary; thus far only six governmental entities have joined-
Bloomfield, Glen Ridge, Kearny, Montclair, Newark, and the Passaic Valley Water Commis-
sion, a quasi-municipal entity which serves three municipalities. M. GREENBERG & R.
HORDON, supra note 13, at app. B, 162.
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A. Allocation of Water Rights: Historical Background
1. Surface Water
In the Northeastern states, the allocation of surface water is based
on riparian rights law, the doctrine generally in effect throughout the
eastern half of the nation. Under riparian principles, an owner of land
adjacent to a river or stream enjoys a usufructuary property right in that
water course. This right allows him to divert surface water for use on
riparian lands.10' A riparian owner's right is not unlimited, however,
and depends on whether the state recognizes the "English rule" or the
"American rule."' 0 2
Under the English rule, each riparian owner is entitled to have the
"natural flow of the stream reach his land materially unaltered except for
the domestic uses of upper riparians.' 0 3 Use of the water on nonripar-
ian lands is not permitted and may be enjoined by another riparian owner
whether or not actual injury results from the nonriparian use.' °4
The restrictiveness of the English rule led the courts of many North-
eastern states to adopt a rule of reasonable use (the "American rule")
with respect to nondomestic uses and, to a lesser extent, nonriparian
uses. Under the American rule, a riparian owner's reasonable use of
water is subject to the equal right of other riparian owners to make a
reasonable use of the water. 0 5 Conflicts as to what constitutes reason-
able use are resolved by the courts.
The riparian rights system of water allocation, with conflicts re-
solved through the courts rather than by administrative procedures,
suited an area with abundant water resources. During the 1950's, how-
ever, a movement developed in the eastern states to shift to the prior
appropriation doctrine, generally applicable in the arid western states, as
a better means of allocating water to the highest beneficial uses in the
public interest.'0 6 Although only one eastern state, Mississippi, adopted
101. 7 C. DAVIS, H. COBLENTZ & C. TITELBAUM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 28 (R.
Clark ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS].
102. Under both rules riparian rights remain appurtenant to the land and cannot be lost by
nonuse. Id. at 42. Such tights are subject, however, to diminution as a result of the legitimate
uses of other riparian owners.
103. Fisher, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, in THE LAW OF
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 75, 77 (D. Haber & S. Bergan eds.
1958).
104. Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 629 (1968).
105. Id. at 630-31; WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 36.
106. Under a prior appropriation system, water allocation is not tied to land ownership.
Rights are allocated administratively, and "it is priority of use, and not equality of right, which
forms the basis of allocation in times of shortage." Hanks, supra note 104, at 625. The doc-
trine allows a senior appropriator to divert the full amount of his water entitlement before any
water may be diverted by a junior appropriator. Fisher, supra note 103, at 82.
The Northeast's interest in the prior appropriation doctrine was less a reaction to actual
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a prior appropriation scheme, 107 many states began thinking in terms of
statewide water resource management. Several states enacted statutes
that modified the common law by requiring permits or licenses for cer-
tain types of water diversion. 08 In most Northeastern states, though,
state involvement in water resource management remained limited to
long-term planning and data collection.
2. Groundwater
Groundwater is subject to common law riparian rules only when it
constitutes an underground stream. To qualify as such, a subterranean
watercourse must possess "a channel, consisting of well-defined beds and
banks, and a current of water' 1 9 whose existence and location are
"known or ascertainable." ' 10 Little groundwater falls within this defini-
tion; rather, most groundwater is classified as "percolating.""' Three
different rules of allocation apply to percolating groundwater: the Eng-
lish or absolute rule, the American or reasonable use rule, and the the
correlative rights rule.
The English rule entitles a landowner to capture all of the percolat-
ing water beneath his property, regardless of the intended use or the ef-
shortages or increased conflicts over water rights than a reflection of the fear that, given the
growing demand for water, shortages and conflicts eventually would occur.
107. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -53 (1972 and Supp. 1984).
108. See Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 99 (1967), and Plager & Mahoney, Emerging Patterns for Regulation of Consumptive
Use of Water in the Eastern United States, 43 IND. L.J. 383 (1968), for discussions of legislative
changes to the common law riparian rights doctrine that occurred during this period. In 1973,
11 of the 31 eastern states, including New Jersey and Maryland, had some form of permit
system. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 282. Today, Connecticut and Del-
aware have general permit systems applicable to surface water and groundwater, and Virginia
has a permit system for critical groundwater areas. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-365 to
-378 (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6003 (1983); VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.84 to -44.106
(1983 and Supp. 1984). New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island regulate diversions of
water for public use. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1501 (McKinney 1984); 32 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 633 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-15-7, -15-8 (1980). By adopting a
permit system, a state institutes administrative procedures for allocating rights to persons to
use specific amounts of water at specific rates of withdrawal and for certain time periods. S.
PLAGER, F. MAHONEY, R. AUSNESS & B. CANTER, FLORIDA WATER LAW-1980 191 (1980).
See Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 547 (1983), for a description of the current permit systems in the eastern states.
109. J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 459 0968).
110. F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION-
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 53.2, at 151 (1968).
111. "Groundwater which does not flow in defined streams lies in geologic formations
known as aquifers. The water moves by seeping through cracks and pores in rock and soil.
Water which moves in this fashion has been referred to as 'percolating.'" T. HENDERSON, J.
TRAUBERMAN & T. GALLAGHER, GROUNDWATER: STRATEGIES FOR STATE ACTION 2-4
(1984). See also Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 628-29 (1970).
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fect such use may have on neighboring groundwater levels. 112 Under the
American rule, a landowner can only use groundwater for beneficial pur-
poses "with a reasonable relationship to the use of his overlying land." 113
Thus, unlike the English rule, the American rule prohibits the use of
percolating water on non-overlying lands. Most of the Northeastern
states have adopted the American rule, particularly as applied to munici-
palities.11 4 Under the rule of correlative rights, courts apportion perco-
lating water among overlying landowners when there is insufficient
supply. This last rule is similar to the riparian rule of reasonable use,
reflecting the notion that water rights are usufructuary, rather than
corporeal. 1 15
The traditional legal distinctions between surface water and ground-
water ignore the principles of hydrology, which demonstrate the interre-
lationship of all water within a watershed basin. Thus commentators
have criticized the common law of water allocation because important
resource decisions are based on inadequate and artificial legal
concepts. 116
B. The 1980-81 Drought's Severity and Impact on Water Distribution
The drought of 1980-81 imposed severe strains on the water supply
systems of many communities in New York, New Jersey and Connecti-
cut. Consider, for example, New York City's system, which normally
supplies 1.5 bgd. By February 1981, the city's reservoirs were reduced to
one-quarter of their capacity. 17 In addition, the Delaware River Basin
Commission had cut the city's entitlement to Delaware River water by
more than one-third, from 800 mgd to 520 mgd.1 18 Faced with these
supply limitations, both the city and Westchester County, which is sup-
plied in part by the New York City water system, imposed restrictions on
residential and nonresidential water use.1 19
In response to water shortages in New Jersey's populous seven
112. S. CIARCY-WANTRUP. W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO & A. STONE, WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 17.1, 52.2(B) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
113. Ausness, supra note 108, at 551.
114. See generally WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 157-59; Hanks &
Hanks, supra note 111, at 630-50.
115. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 111, at 640-48.
116. "Ground water [sic] is often naturally interrelated with surface water: ground water
feeds springs and surface streams, and surface water charges ground water reservoirs. Never-
theless, there persists [sic] in the laws of many States myths (long ago abandoned by hydrolo-
gists) that ground water is separate from and unrelated to surface water." NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 233. The Commission recommended an integrated management
approach to both surface water and groundwater. Id.
117. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 104.
118. Id. at 927.
119. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1981, at B-3, col. 6.
New York City supplies approximately 100,000 gallons of water per day to surrounding com-
munities, most of them in Westchester County. 1979 Hearings, supra note 26, at 223.
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northern counties, 120 the Governor declared a state of emergency. He
ordered a twenty-five percent reduction in the area's industrial consump-
tion and limited residential consumption to fifty gallons per person per
day, approximately seventy-five percent of the typical daily in-home
use. 121
Many communities in Connecticut also restricted residential water
use. For example, when its total water supply dwindled to a level that
could only last for twenty days, the Town of Greenwich limited individ-
ual residents to forty-five gallons per day, about forty percent of the typi-
cal daily in-home use for the area. 122
Not every locality in the Northeast, however, faced water supply
problems. Communities within ten miles of Greenwich, for example, did
not have a shortage requiring restrictions on water use. 123 The largest
water company in Connecticut, Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, had a
surplus of water, 24 but no interconnecting pipelines to deliver water to
Greenwich. The same pattern was evident in New Jersey. Not only were
there significant differences among neighboring communities, depending
upon the storage capacity of their water suppliers, but two state-owned
reservoirs, Spruce Run and Round Valley, with a combined storage ca-
pacity of sixty-six billion gallons, were near capacity; only a pipeline to
transfer the water from the reservoirs to the suffering communities was
missing. 125
The question raised is why the water supply systems in these states
were unable to provide a more rational distribution of water in a time of
shortage.
120. About 3.5 million people, 48% of the state's population, reside in these seven north-
ern counties. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 2.
121. Exec. Order No. 98, New Jersey (1980); 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 221.
122. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, at B6, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 23, at 1, col. 3;
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, ENGINEERING TASK FORCE REPORT: WATER SHORTAGES IN
SOUHTWESTERN CONNECTICUT 13-15 (1981). Forty-five gallons per day would provide
enough water to satisf basic needs such as drinking, cooking, and washing clothes and dishes,
plus one three-minute shower and three toilet flushes per day. Office of the Governor of New
Jersey, Press Release (Sept. 27, 1980), at 3.
123. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 23, at 1, col. 3.
124. Id.; ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, supra note 122, at 1.
125. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1980, § IV, at 6, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1980, at 40, col. 3.
The Round Valley and Spruce Run Reservoirs, with a combined yield of 160 mgd, are approxi-
mately 26 miles west of the drought area. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1980, at B2, col. 1. When New
Jersey's Governor imposed water rationing, reservoirs owned by the Hackensack Water Com-
pany, serving 800,000 northeastern New Jersey residents, were filled to only 28% of capacity,
while Round Valley Reservoir, the larger of the two state-owned reservoirs, was filled to 84%
of capacity.
[Vol. 12:429
W4 TER SUPPLY IN THE NORTHEAST
C. Legal Structures in the Three States.-
Influence on Response to Crisis
1. Connecticut
The regulation of water resources in Connecticut is carried on by
three state agencies: the Department of Environmental Protection, the
Department of Health Services, and the Public Utilities Commission.
The Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Health
Services, and the state's planning agency, the Office of Policy and Man-
agement, are responsible for developing long term plans for water re-
source management. 26
The Department of Environmental Protection regulates the alloca-
tion of water. At the time of the 1980-81 drought, all Connecticut water
systems needed Department of Environmental Protection approval to di-
vert water from rivers, 12 7 and investor-owned systems needed approval
to sell surplus water. 128 Since the enactment of the Connecticut Water
Diversion Policy Act in 1982, the Department of Environmental Protec-
tion has administered a permit system of allocation. 129
The Department of Health Services has jurisdiction over "all mat-
ters concerning the purity and adequacy of any source of water or ice
supply used by any municipality."'' 30 Like health agencies in other
states, the role of the Department of Health Services is primarily limited
to questions of drinking water quality.13' All water supply systems in
Connecticut must report annually to the Department of Health Serv-
ices,32 and all proposed construction or expansion of water sources re-
quires Department of Health Services approval. 33 In addition, no water
supply system, whether investor-owned or municipally-owned, can sell
watershed lands without Department of Health Services approval. 34
The Public Utilities Commission regulates Connecticut's investor-
owned water supply systems. The Department of Public Utility Control,
which serves as a staff for the Public Utilities Commission, is the state
agency most actively involved in the daily operations of such systems.
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-352 to -353 (West Supp. 1983). Despite the
Departnment of Health Services' statutory role in water resources planning, none of its Water
Supply Section's 11 members (seven full-time professional engineers and four part-time em-
ployees) is directly responsible for water resources planning. Telephone interview with Ray
Jarema, Chief, Water Supply Section, Connecticut Dep't of Health Services (Aug. 1, 1983).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-8(a) (West 1975).
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-358 (West Supp. 1976-1983).
129. Id. §§ 22a-365 to -378. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the new permit system.
130. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-32(a) (West Supp. 1984).
131. Telephone interview with Ray Jarema, supra note 126.
132. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-33(a) (West 1975).
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-33(b) (West Supp. 1984).
134. Id. § 25-32(b).
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Although municipally-owned systems must file annual reports with the
Public Utilities Commission, 135 the Commission has no jurisdiction over
those systems or over systems owned by homeowner or condominium
associations. 136
The Public Utilities Commission monitors the adequacy of service
provided by investor-owned systems. 137 The Commission reviews not
only financial matters, but also the adequacy of each company's sup-
ply.138 Since 1982, the Public Utilities Commission has been authorized
to petition the courts for a receiver to take over any water company that
it finds is not providing adequate service. 139 In practice, however, the
power of the Public Utilities Commission to require the maintenance of a
particular safe yield or to insist on capital improvements or changes in
operations continues to depend on the Commission's power to withhold
approval for rate increases. 140
Connecticut has 585 public water systems, 141 which serve about
eighty-two percent of the state's population. 42 Investor-owned systems
predominate in Connecticut;143 however, the majority of these systems
serve areas with populations of less than 1000. Only one investor-owned
system, Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, provides water to more than
100,000 persons. Only 61 of Connecticut's public water supply systems
are government owned. 44 Public authorities serve the large metropoli-
tan areas of Hartford and New Haven, both of which have populations of
more than 100,000.145
During the 1980-81 drought, no Connecticut agency had the power
135. Id. § 16-29.
136. Id. § 16-1.
137. Id. § 16-6b.
138. In monitoring the adequacy of supply, the Commission has required each investor-
owned system to maintaim a safe yield that is 10% above the system's average daily demand.
Interview with Peter Kosak, supra note 62.
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-252(1) (West Supp. 1984).
140. Rate hearings for water companies comprise about 80% of the Commission's
caseload. Data from the Connecticut Dep't of Public Utilities Control supplied to the author
(June 1983). For a number of reasons, however, the issues of adequate supply and service by
smaller investor-owned systems may not be receiving the necessary level of attention. The
aggregate revenue for all regulated water supply systems in Connecticut was $74 million in
1982, as compared with $3.4 billion for other regulated utilities. In addition, the support staff
at the Department of Public Utility Control includes only three engineers specializing in water
supply. Telephone interview with Peter Kosak, Assoc. Utilities Engineer, Engineering Div.,
Dep't of Public Utilities Control (Aug. 2, 1983).
141. Data from the Natural Resources Center, Connecticut Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
supplied to the author (July 1982) (containing preliminary data regarding Connecticut water
resources and supply systems) [hereinafter cited as Connecticut Preliminary Data].
142. Id.
143. See supra note 54.
144. Connecticut Preliminary Data, supra note 141. Among the government-owned sys-
tems are nine state-owned systems which serve an airport, two jails, three hospitals, and three
schools. The other 52 government-owned systems are owned by municipalities.
145. Id.
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to order water systems to interconnect pipelines absent a state declara-
tion of emergency. 1 46 The state never declared a state of emergency, ap-
parently because officials feared potential liability to firms forced to
curtail operations as a result of a reduction in water supply. 147 The De-
partment of Environmental Protection, the Public Utilities Commission,
and the Department of Health Services, however, participated in negotia-
tions among local communities in southwest Connecticut concerning the
possibility of establishing emergency interconnections.
When the negotiations began, the Connecticut-American Water
Company, serving the Town of Greenwich, was in danger of running out
of water.' 48 The Stamford Water Company, serving the nearby City of
Stamford, was in a position to help because, although it had a smaller
water basin than the Greenwich system, it had greater storage capac-
ity.' 49 Interconnections capable of carrying up to ten mgd already linked
the two systems. ' 50 As a result of the negotiations, Stamford shipped one
mgd to Greenwich from the end of December 1980 through mid-Febru-
ary 1981.15 Greenwich also negotiated with two other nearby water
supply systems: Norwalk Taxing District No. 2, a quasi-municipal sys-
tem east of Stamford which had ample water for its own needs, and
Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, still further east, which enjoyed a sur-
plus. 152 Although Norwalk was initially reluctant to phrt with any
water, 5 3 the system eventually agreed to supply needed water to Green-
146. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1981, § 23, at 1, col. 5.
147. Id.
148. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 23, at 1, col. 3.
149. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at BI & B12, col. 1.
150. Telephone interview with Joseph Yates, Manager, Connecticut-American Water
Company (Aug. 1, 1983).
151. Although the interconnections were capable of transferring more than one mgd,
Stamford was unwilling to sell more than that amount because of its own customers' needs.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at B1, col. 5. Stamford transferred a total of 38 million gallons of
water to Connecticut-American, which paid $400 per million gallons. In addition, the latter
company was obligated to, and did, return all 38 million gallons to the Stamford system at no
charge. Thus, Connecticut-American paid Stamford a total of $30,400 (using $400 as the
market value). Telephone interview with Joseph Yates, supra note 150. The supervising engi-
neer at the Department of Public Utility Control reported that some persons considered the
"total package" to be over-priced. He added, however, that time pressures and the lack of
other sources left no other alternative. Telephone interview with Peter Kosak, supra note 140.
152. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 23, at 1, col. 3.
153. According to a Connecticut-American Water Company official, Norwalk's reluctance
to sell water was connected to its attempts to pressure the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection into approving Norwalk's diversion of water from a nearby river to substitute for any
water supplied to Greenwich. Under Connecticut law, the river could not be used for drinking
water without a waiver from the Department. The Norwalk water system had unsuccessfully
sought a general waiver from the Department prior to the drought. Telephone interview with
Joseph Yates, supra note 150. Officials at Norwalk, however, attributed the reluctance to sell
water to the lack of assurance that any costs incurred by the Norwalk system to purchase
additional water from Bridgeport Hydraulic, to make up for water delivered out of the Nor-
walk system to Greenwich, would be repaid. In essence, the Norwalk system was afraid to
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wich. Unfortunately, the agreement could not be implemented without
construction of an emergency pipeline. Given the length of the negotia-
tions and the physical difficulties posed by the geography of the area, it
was not feasible to construct a pipeline within the necessary time. 5 4
For several years preceding the drought of 1980-81, the water sup-
ply systems of southwestern Connecticut had considered the concept of a
permanent regional pipeline, but they failed to act on the idea. Officials
at Connecticut-American and Bridgeport Hydraulic attributed this inac-
tion to questions about financing and a lack of agreement regarding the
need for a pipeline.' 55 A recent Army Corps of Engineers study recom-
mends the construction of such a project and estimates that a six-mile
pipeline from Norwalk to Stamford, capable of carrying 8.5 mgd, would
cost $5.2 million.' 56
The recent shortages have given new impetus to negotiations that
may lead to the construction of a pipeline connecting Bridgeport Hy-
draulic with Greenwich. Under the current proposal, Bridgeport Hy-
draulic would construct and operate the pipeline, and would receive
financial support from investor-owned companies connecting to the new
line. 15 7 The Stamford Water Company has been cautious about partici-
pating in the project.' 5 8 Bridgeport Hydraulic and Stamford Water
Company, hbwever, are presently negotiating an agreement whereby
Bridgeport Hydraulic will acquire Stamford. 5 9 The acquisition of Stam-
ford Water Company would eliminate a major obstacle to plans for the
pipeline. 160
Another obstacle to the proposed pipeline is the opposition ex-
pressed by the two quasi-municipally-owned systems that serve the town
of Norwalk: Norwalk Taxing District No. 1 and Norwalk Taxing Dis-
trict No. 2.161 Officials from the area's investor-owned systems suggest
that the Norwalk systems oppose the pipeline project because it threatens
their hopes to draw drinking water from the Norwalk River, 162 which
commit to buy water from Bridgeport Hydraulic until the drought conditions were severe
enough to assure that all purchased water would be needed by Greenwich. Telephone inter-
view with John Hiscock, Chief Engineer, Norwalk Taxing District No. 2 (Sept. 29, 1983).
154. Interview with Carolyn Gimbrone, Senior Environmental Analyst, Natural Re-
sources Center, Connecticut Dep't of Envt'l. Protection (July 23, 1982).
155. Interview with Theodore K. Hildebrand, Director of Engineering, New England Div.
of the American Water Works Service Co. (Aug. 2, 1982); telephone interview with Robert H.
Reinert, Executive Vice President, Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. (Sept. 3, 1982).
156. HOUSATONIC STUDY, supra note 14, at 25.
157. Telephone interview with Robert H. Reinert, Executive Vice President, Bridgeport
Hydraulic Co. (Aug. 2, 1983).
158. Id.; telephone interview with Joseph Yates, supra note 150.
159. Telephone interview with Robert H. Reinert, supra note 157.
160. As of August 2, 1983, Bridgeport and Stamford had reached an agreement, and were
awaiting the Public Utility Commission's expected approval. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 153.
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fails to meet Department of Environmental Protection quality standards.
Although the Department of Environmental Protection has the power to
waive its standards, the Norwalk systems thus far have not persuaded the
agency to do so. Should a new pipeline make water available to Norwalk
from the Bridgeport system, Norwalk's case for receiving the waiver
would be greatly weakened. 163
An official from Norwalk Taxing District No. 2 described a different
reason fc the district's "violent" opposition to the project. He argued
that the pipeline will cost more if owned and financed by Bridgeport Hy-
draulic, an investor-owned system, than if owned and financed by a gov-
ernmental entity. 164 The official acknowledged that his system was
seeking legislative approval to withdraw water from the Norwalk River,
which would allow the town to satisfy its water needs at minimal costs
for the next fifty years. 165 Despite significant cost differences between
obtaining water from the Norwalk River and participating in a regional
pipeline, there seems to be some willingness on the part of Norwalk Tax-
ing District No. 2 to support a regional pipeline if it is owned by a gov-
ernment authority. Norwalk's objection to the current proposal
apparently derives primarily from a distrust of investor-owned systems
and from a perception that the interests of private shareholders and the
Public Utilities Commission are inconsistent with those of ratepayers.
Had a regional pipeline existed in 1980, Greenwich could have re-
ceived needed water from other water companies that possessed sur-
pluses. The question still remains as to why Greenwich's water system
was so much more vulnerable than neighboring systems. The answer
reveals certain other failings in the regulatory scheme existing at the
time. A review of the Public Utilities Commission's decision regarding a
rate increase requested by Connecticut-American after the water crisis,
as well as discussions with various persons involved in the 1980-81
drought, indicates that there was a failure by the water company to in-
crease its water supply in order to meet increasing demand in a commu-
nity with high water consumption patterns and increasing commercial
and industrial use. 166 There was also a failure to reduce water leakage,
which the Public Utilities Commission calculated to be over eighteen per-
cent.167 These factors made the Greenwich system more vulnerable dur-
163. Telephone interview with Robert H. Reinert, supra note 155; telephone interview
with Joseph Yates, supra note 150.
164. Telephone interview with John Hiscock, supra note 153.
165. Id.
166. State of Connecticut, Dep't of Public Utility Control, Decision in the Application of
the Connecticut-American Water Company to Increase its Rates to All Customers, No. 81-10-
03 (May 20, 1982), at 16-17 [hereinafter cited as 1982 PUC Decision].
167. The Commission rejected rate increases to cover the company's cost of dealing with
the emergency on the ground that the additional costs were due to management failures to deal
with the need for increased supply and reduced leakage. Id.
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ing a drought than other communities. The 1982 decision of the Public
Utilities Commission also shows that an earlier warning by the Commis-
sion concerning the inadequacy of the system's water supply had failed to
forestall the crisis.168
Attempts by the Public Utilities Commission to condition rate in-
creases on improvement of services thus far have not yielded results. 69
For example, in 1982 the Commission ordered Connecticut-American's
parent company, the American Waterworks Company, a large holding
company of investor-owned systems, to devise a plan for increasing its
equity position in Connecticut-American. 170 This would reduce Con-
necticut-American's heavy reliance on debt. According to newspaper re-
ports, American Waterworks has refused to pursue future equity
investment unless the Commission increases its equity rate of return. 171
In Connecticut, at the time of the 1980-81 drought, there was little
state involvement in the allocation of water rights. In particular, infor-
mation regarding existing water rights and supply was not centralized.
Some of the failings in state regulation revealed by the 1980-81 drought
have since been corrected by legislation.
The Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act172 establishes a permit
system, administered by the Department of Environmental Protection,
for future diversions of surface water and groundwater by any person,
including municipalities. 173 Existing diversions were to be registered by
July 1, 1983, or become subject to the permit provisions of the Act. 174
The Act sets no specific duration for permits, but empowers the agency
to temporarily suspend or place additional conditions upon permits dur-
ing water supply emergencies. 75 In addition, no permit can be trans-
ferred without the Department of Environmental Protection's
168. A 1976 Public Utility Commission decision on Connecticut-American's request for a
rate increase noted the narrow margin between Connecticut-American's safe yield and its aver-
age daily demand, and warned the company of the consequences of delaying the development
of new sources. State of Connecticut, Dep't of Public Utility Control, Decision in the Applica-
tion of the Connecticut-American Water Company to Increase its Rates to All Customers, No.
76-01-04 (June 21, 1976), at 7-8 [hereinafter cited as 1976 PUC Decision]. In 1976 and in
1980, the Connecticut-American system's safe yield was 17.0 mgd. By Commission standards,
which use 10% as an adequate margin of safety between safe yield and average daily demand,
Connecticut-American's average daily demand should have been "no more than 15.30 mgd."
1982 PUC Decision, supra note 166, at 16. In 1976, the system's average daily demand was
15.2 mgd, while in 1980 it was 16.78 mgd. 1976 PUC Decision, supra, at 7; 1982 PUC Deci-
sion, supra note 166, at 16.
169. 1982 PUC Decision, supra note 166, at 22.
170. Id.
171. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1982, § 23, at 1, col. 1.
172. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-365 to -378 (West Supp. 1984).
173. Id. § 22a-365.
174. Id. § 22a-377(a)(1), (2). The Act exempts diversions of less than 50,000 gallons in a
24-hour period. Id. § 22a-368.
175. Id. § 22a-378(a)(l).
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approval.1 76 Ironically, the Water Diversion Policy Act was not passed
in response to the 1980-81 drought, but was a reaction by rural Connecti-
cut communities to the Hartford Metropolitan Authority's attempt to
acquire water rights from outside its watershed basin. 177
More direct outgrowths of the 1980-81 drought are Public Acts 81-
358178 and 81-427.179 The first of these acts empowers the Public Utili-
ties Commission to require an investor-owned water company to inter-
connect with another investor-owned company or with a municipal
system desiring an interconnection, if the Commission finds that such
action "would be an effective means of relieving site-specific water
shortages."' 80 Consistent with its jurisdictional limits,' 8' the Public Util-
ities Commission has no power to order a municipally-owned system to
interconnect with another system, regardless of whether the municipally-
owned system has a water surplus or deficit. Under the second statute,
Public Act 81-427, any construction or expansion of a water source must
be approved by the Public Utilities Commission. 8 2 In making its deci-
sions, the Public Utilities Commission must consider whether the appli-
cant system will operate the new facility "in a reliable and efficient
manner" and whether unnecessary "duplication of water service" might
result. 8 3 This statute gives the Commission broad power to control the
number of new systems created in the state and to encourage the merger
of existing systems.
In reaction to the drought, the Connecticut legislature also amended
the statute that empowers the Department of Health Services to approve
or deny proposals for new water supply sources. 18 4 Prior to the drought,
Department of Health Services based its decisions on criteria relating to
the "purity and adequacy" of prospective supply sources. 8 5 Now the
agency must also consider the possible effects of the proposed system on
other nearby systems, including private wells.' 86
While the Water Diversion Policy Act seems to designate the De-
partment of Environmental Protection as the lead agency in water re-
source management, the other two state agencies continue to exercise
overlapping jurisdiction. A task force has been created to examine
176. Id. § 22a-368(c).
177. Interview with Carolyn Gimbrone, supra note 154.
178. 1981 Conn. Acts 358 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-262k
(West Supp. 1984)).
179. 1981 Conn. Acts 427 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-262m
(West Supp. 1984).
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-262k (West Supp. 1984).
181. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-262m (West Supp. 1984).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 25-33(b).
185. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-33(b) (West 1975).
186. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-33(b) (West Supp. 1984).
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agency responsibilities as well as the much broader issue of water supply
distribution.187
2. New Jersey
New Jersey has a far longer history of state regulation of water
rights than Connecticut. New Jersey's first statutory modification of
common law water rights occurred in 1905, when the state legislature
passed a law requiring state approval for all interstate water diver-
sions.1 88 In 1907, the state established a permit system governing all
water diversions for public water supply use. In 1947, the permit system
was extended to large private groundwater diversions in designated ar-
eas. 189 The 1963 permit system, 190 applicable to private surface water
diversions in designated areas, placed New Jersey at the forefront of the
eastern states in enlightened water resource management. 191
At the time of the recent drought, the Department of Environmen-
tal Protection was New Jersey's primary water resource management
agency. The Department regulated both allocation and water quality,
except that diversion permits required the approval of the Water Policy
and Supply Council, a lay board appointed by the Governor. 192
Public water supply systems in New Jersey rely heavily on both sur-
face water and groundwater. The southern region depends mainly on
groundwater, while the state's more urbanized northern region uses
mostly surface water. 193 New Jersey has 622 water supply systems, 397
of which serve less than 1000 customers each. 194 Municipally-owned sys-
tems account for about one-half of the water supply systems. 95 New
Jersey's largest supplier is the investor-owned Elizabethtown Water
Company. 196 Two other major systems in northern New Jersey are oper-
ated by regional authorities. These two entities, the North New Jersey
District Water Supply Commission and the Passaic Valley Water Com-
mission, were formed, pursuant to state statute, 19 7 through the voluntary
187. 1982 Conn. Acts 8228 (Spec. Sess.).
188. 1905 N.J. Laws 238, § 1 (repealed by 1965 N.J. Laws 70, § 2).
189. Permits are required for groundwater diversions exceeding 100,000 gallons per day.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-7 (West 1982).
190. 1963 N.J. Laws 181 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:lA-3(g) (West 1982)).
191. Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 99, 101, 106 (1967).
192. 1981 N.J. Laws 262, § 26.
193. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 1.
194. Telephone interview with Stephen Neiswan, Bureau Chief, Water Supply Planning,
Div. of Water Resources, New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection (Aug. 2, 1983).
195. Id.
196. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 5; telephone interview with Ste-
phen Nieswan, supra note 194.
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:62-109 (West 1967), 58:5-1 (West 1982).
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association of member municipalities. 198
New Jersey's Board of Public Utilities regulates the water rates
charged by investor-owned water companies. 199 The Board also regu-
lates the rates charged by municipal water companies for extraterritorial
sales if the extra-territorial service is to more than 1000 customers, or if
outside sales are more than twenty-five percent of the system's total reve-
nues. 2°° Eighteen of the approximately 300 municipally-owned systems
are subject to Board of Public Utilities regulation. 20 1
Contracting between water supply systems is a common practice.
The New Jersey Master Plan identifies 590 interconnections between
water supply systems, although only 150 are used for regular water trans-
fers. 20 2 The twenty-five largest systems in the state are the ultimate
source for seventy-five percent of the water distributed by public water
supply systems. 20 3 All contracts by municipalities for the purchase of
water require Department of Environmental Protection approval; con-
tracts are limited to fifteen years if the other party is a municipality and
thirty years if the other party is a private entity.20 4
Long before the 1980-81 drought, it was recognized that the densely
populated and highly industrialized northeastern part of New Jersey, lo-
cated in the Passaic and Hackensack water basins, did not have sufficient
water to meet demand. 20 5 In the 1950's, protracted debate over how to
increase the water supply culminated in the construction of two large
state-owned reservoirs, Spruce Run and Round Valley, using the Raritan
River in central New Jersey. 20 6 The original proposal for the reservoirs
contemplated that the state would build filtration facilities and the neces-
sary pipelines to bring water to the northeast section of the state.20 7
'These aspects of the plan were eliminated as a result of strong opposition
by the major water supply systems, which feared competition from the
state.20 8 One opponent, the North New Jersey District Water Supply
198. Neither regional authority has taxing power. The Passaic Valley Water Commission
has no bonding authority, while the North New Jersey Water Supply Commission has limited
authority to issue bonds for transmission facilities, but not for impounding facilities. N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58:5-33, -43 (West 1982). Capital investments are financed by the individual
members. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:62-132, 58:5-22 (West 1967 and 1982).
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21 (West 1969).
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-85.2 (West Supp. 1984).
201. Telephone interview with Douglas Ziemba, Supervising Engineer, New Jersey Board
of Public Utilities (Aug. 3, 1983). In addition, all municipally-owned systems must report
their rates directly to the Department of Consumer Affairs, although that agency has no regu-
latory power over the systems. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-26 (West 1967).
202. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 15.
203. Id. at 1.
204. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-49 (West 1967).
205. J. MIRI, supra note 49, at 88; 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 316.
206. See J. MIRI, supra note 49, at 120-212.
207. Id. at 156-57.
208. Id.
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Commission, proposed to construct a pipeline to bring water to the
northeastern communities, but was unable to obtain sufficient support
from its member communities to fund construction. 20 9 Today, some of
the water reaches northeastern New Jersey indirectly, through purchase
and resale by the Elizabethtown Water Company. Almost half the reser-
voirs' capacity, however, has never been contracted for. 210
The failure of these reservoirs to remedy the water supply problems
of northern New Jersey, coupled with increasing concerns about the
quantity and quality of groundwater in southern New Jersey, led the
state to commission the New Jersey Master Plan, 21' which was com-
pleted in 1981. To meet the state's near-term 21 2 water needs, the New
Jersey Master Plan recommends that the state fund four water supply
projects between 1981 and 1985, including a pipeline to connect the
Round Valley and Spruce Run reservoirs with the northeastern part of
the state.21 3 The drought of 1980-81 and a major water main break in
Newark in July 1981 were fortuitously timed to promote public support
for a $350 million general obligation state bond issue for water supply
projects, which was approved in a November 1981 referendum. 214 Pur-
suant to the referendum, however, each specific appropriation for a pro-
ject must be approved by the legislature. 215 Thus, the major battles over
interbasin transfers from the Raritan basin to the northeastern communi-
ties in the Passaic basin are yet to come, with the outcome far from cer-
tain. For example, in response to political pressures, feasibility studies
are currently being conducted to consider alternatives to a pipeline. 21 6
The crisis of 1980-81 prompted the New Jersey legislature to grant
the Department of Environmental Protection broader regulatory powers.
The state adopted a more extensive permit system by giving the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection authority to modify existing uses pre-
viously exempted from regulation. 21 7 The legislation transferred all
functions of the Water Policy and Supply Council to the Department of
Environmental Protection and created a new Water Supply Advisory
209. Id. at 156-59.
210. Id. at 199-204.
211. See supra note 29.
212. "Near-term" is defined as water supply needs for the period 1985-2000. 1981 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 149.
213. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 72.
214. Water Supply Bond Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 261.
215. Id. § 15(a).
216. Telephone interview with Stephen Neiswan, supra note 194.
217. Water Supply Management Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 262 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 58:1A-1 to -17 (West 1982)). The New Jersey Master Plan strongly recommended that the
Department of Environmental Protection be given the ability to regulate existing uses. This
power was considered particularly important in connection with groundwater, because prior
law had excluded diversions of over 740 mgd from both reporting and permitting require-
ments. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 13.
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Council, which has a purely advisory role in permitting and in other
water supply matters. 218 The legislature also strengthened the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection's powers to order both municipally-
owned and investor-owned systems to interconnect and to upgrade their
facilities.219
In addition, the legislature adopted the Small Water Company Act
of 1981,220 which jointly vests the Department of Environmental Protec-
tion and the Board of Public Utilities with the power to order the merger
of water systems, regardless of their form of ownership.221 There is some
doubt, however, over the extent to which these agencies will use their
new powers under this Act. The New Jersey Master Plan, which is in-
tended to guide these agencies in the exercise of their authority, pays
homage to the role of local governments with the following principle:
Responsibility for the development of water resources and the operation
of water supply systems should be commensurate with the lowest level of
government capable of being financially responsible for the particular
water supply project. 222
Furthermore, the Administrator of the Water Supply and Watershed
Management Section of the Department of Environmental Protection
has indicated a general reluctance to interfere with the prerogatives of
local governments. 223
Currently, the Department of Environmental Protection is concen-
trating on obtaining the necessary feasibility studies for the projects spec-
ified in the New Jersey Master Plan, and on administering a $15 million
revolving loan program, funded out of bonds issued pursuant to the 1981
referendum, for the construction of interconnections among the state's
water systems. 224 Under the terms of the referendum, only municipally-
owned systems are eligible to participate in the program, but they are free
to interconnect with investor-owned systems.225 The purpose of the pro-
gram is to enable systems to move water to areas where it is needed in
times of emergency. The goal set out in the proposed regulations is to
218. Water Supply Management Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 262, §§ 17-20 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-49.1 to 49.4 (West Supp 1984-1985)).
219. The Water Supply Management Act provides that the Department may "order the
interconnection of public water supply systems whether in public or private ownership, when-
ever the department determines that the public interest requires that the interconnection be
made. ... 1981 N.J. Laws 262, § 15(e) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:lA-15(e) (West
1982)).
220. 1981 N.J. Laws 347 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:11-59 (West Supp. 1984)).
221. Id.
222. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 30.
223. Interview with William Whipple, Administrator, Water Supply and Watershed Man-
agement Section, New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection (Oct. 25, 1982).
224. Id.
225. The funds generated by the referendum can only be used for water supply facilities
(defined to include interconnections) which are owned by the state or its political subdivisions.
Water Supply Bond Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 261, § 3(i).
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enable all water supply systems in New Jersey to be interconnected with
other systems so that any system can obtain a minimum of fifty percent
of its "average water supply usage" from other systems, with no more
than thirty-five percent coming from any one adjacent system. 226 Prior-
ity will be given to small systems that are responding to an order or
recommendation of the Department of Environmental Protection to re-
pair or construct interconnections. 227 Given the relatively limited
amount of funds available, it is uncertain whether the program will attain
its goals.
As another response to the 1980-81 drought, the legislature created
the New Jersey Water Supply Authority. 228 The Authority was given
title to all existing state water facilities, including the Round Valley and
Spruce Run reservoirs, and will be the owner of any new state funded
water projects.229 The legislation specifically denies the Authority the
power to "plan, initiate, acquire, construct, maintain or operate any re-
tail water system or project., 230 An earlier draft of the legislation would
have authorized the Authority to distribute water, and to construct and
operate water supply facilities.23' (Under this draft, the Authority would
have been termed the "New Jersey Water Supply Utility. ' 232) As was
the case with the legislation for the Round Valley and Spruce Run Reser-
voirs, the power to engage in the distribution of water was deleted from
the final bill.
The 1981 bond referendum instructs the Authority and the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection to work with the Board of Public
Utilities to develop a program that, "to the maximum extent practicable
and feasible," will charge each water supply system that benefits from
any state water project for "the full cost of planning, designing, acquir-
ing, constructing and operating" the project.233 These provisions reflect
the state's experience with Round Valley and Spruce Run. Much of the
capacity of these reservoirs has remained uncommitted, and conse-
quently the revenues received by the state have not been sufficient to re-
tire the bonds issued to finance their construction. 234
226. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1G-2:12(f) (proposed Oct. 1982).
227. Id. § 1G-2:12(h), (a).
228. New Jersey Water Supply Authority Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 293 (codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58:1B-1 to -25 (West 1982)).
229. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1B-5 (West 1982).
230. Id. § 58:1B-17.
231. The Senate bill would have empowered the Authority to "plan, .... construct, .
[and] operate 'projects.'" A "project" was defined as a "water system or any part thereof,"
which in turn was defined to include "water distribution systems." N.J. Senate Bill No. 1612
§§ 6a, 3(i), 3(m) (1980).
232. Id. § 1.
233. Water Supply Bond Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 261, § 5(b).
234. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 321; N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1980, at B2, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1980, at 40, col. 3.
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The Water Supply Authority Act adopted, by implication, the New
Jersey Master Plan's recommendation that the capital costs of any new
state-financed "drought insurance" facility, such as the Raritan-Passaic
pipeline, be paid by the water supply systems served by the project in
proportion to each system's safe yield deficits. 235 Systems with the larg-
est deficits would pay the highest proportion of the costs. 2 36 Deficits
would be recalculated every five years.237 If a system reduced its safe
yield deficit by developing its own supplies or purchasing water from
other systems, its payment to the state would be reduced, and the state
would have to pay the shortfall. 238 Thus, the recommended method of
financing runs the risk of leaving the state with more white elephants,
should suppliers find cheaper sources of water. A water supply official
from the Department of Environmental Protection indicated, however,
that the Department would be able to prevent competing projects from
being developed through its power to approve new diversions.239 It re-
mains to be seen whether the New Jersey Master Plan's method of financ-
ing will be used, and if so, whether New Jersey water politics will allow
the Department of Environmental Protection to exercise its powers as
the official contemplated.
In summary, with its new legislation, New Jersey continues its tradi-
tion of strong state regulation and direct state involvement in the provi-
sion of water. Despite this strong. involvement, earlier legislation to
allocate water failed to protect New Jersey residents from periodic water
shortages because the shortages derived largely from problems of distri-
bution. The recent legislation, combined with the passage of the 1981
bond referendum, has given New Jersey some of the tools that it needs to
restructure water distribution. The state's program to promote construc-
tion of interconnections is an important first step. The state's history of
deference to local government, however, raises doubts about its willing-
ness and ability to use these new tools.
3. New York
New York State has approximately 1900 public water supply sys-
tems. 24° Of these, 1400 are municipally-owned, consisting primarily of
235. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1B-6(a) (West 1982); NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra
note 29, at 61.
236. NEW JERSEY MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 61.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Interview with William Whipple, supra note 223.
240. This number does not include private systems such as those that serve mobile home
parks and private institutions. When such systems qualify as public water systems, as defined
by the Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (1982), they are regulated by the Depart-
ment of Health. Letter from Stuart Dean, Chief Permit Administrator for Water Supply, Bu-
reau of Water Resources, New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, to the author (Aug. 3,
1982).
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city and village water departments and town and county water dis-
tricts.24 1 The largest water supply system, that of New York City, gener-
ally operates independently of state regulation. 242 The New York City
Department of Environmental Protection operates and regulates the
quantity and quality of the city's water supply system.243 All of the city's
water is surface water, piped from upstate New York.244 New York City
essentially operates a regional water system in the sense that communi-
ties in the eight counties through which the city's aqueducts pass are
entitled to water from the city's system at the same rate that city resi-
dents pay. 245 For example, seventy-two percent of Westchester County
is supplied by the New York City system:246 Total use of New York City
water outside of the city is 100 mgd, about seven percent of the water
supplied by the system. 247
The New York Department of Environmental Conservation is the
lead agency for the regulation of other public water systems in the state.
The Department administers a permit system which regulates all uses of
water for both public consumption and irrigation.248 The agency must
approve all proposals to create, or add to, sources of water supply for
these uses.249 Individual systems, moreover, need Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation approval before they can extend service to areas
not included in their original permits.250 The agency must approve all
sales of water between individual systems. 251 Permits are also required
for any interstate water transfers252 and for digging wells with a pumping
capacity in excess of forty-five gallons per minute on Long Island.253
241. Letter from Stuart Dean, supra note 240. Cities and villages may operate their own
water supply systems. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 20(2), (7) (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1984);
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 11-1102 (McKinney 1973). Counties and towns use special districts to
provide water services. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 250(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.Y. TOWN
LAW §§ 190, 198(3), (8) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1984).
242. New York City's water supply system is subject, however, to the state permit system.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0111 (McKinney 1984).
243. ADMIN. CODE CITY OF NEW YORK § K51-42.0 (1975).
244. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 475; Buck, Drought City: The Real Scenario, NEW
YORK MAG., Feb. 23, 1981, at 21-22.
245. ADMIN. CODE CITY OF NEW YORK § K51-42.0 (1975).
246. 1979 Hearings, supra note 26, at 249.
247. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2, at 636.
248. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-1501, -1503 (McKinney 1977).
249. Id. § 15-1501(1).
250. Id. § 15-1501.
251. The regulations issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation, pursuant
to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1501 (McKinney 1977), enumerate the actions that
require a permit; among these are "entering into contract or other agreement for supply of
water." N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, Part 601 (1972).
252. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1505 (McKinney 1984).
253. Id. § 15-1527. This requirement was enacted to prevent overdrafting and the intru-
sion of salt water into the groundwater. Conservation Law of 1911, 1911 N.Y. Laws 647,
§ 476.
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The Department of Environmental Conservation does not have the
power to order interconnections between systems, although municipali-
ties have broad powers to work with other municipalities and investor-
owned systems to provide emergency interconnections. 254 The Depart-
ment can, however, order a system that requests approval of a new
source of supply to serve communities that the Department determines
should be supplied from the new source.255
The Department of Environmental Conservation has seldom been
forced to choose between two or more competing proposed public supply
uses. Water supply permits are rarely denied or conditioned. The De-
partment has, however, exerted pressure on applicants in some instances
to alter their plans to obtain a more rational use of water. For example,
the Department has sometimes urged a system to connect with another
system rather than develop separate supplies. 256
In October 1982, the permit section at the Department of Environ-
mental Conservation consisted of one person for the entire state, exclud-
ing Long Island. 257 Without its own staff to review and investigate
permit applications, the Department of Environmental Conservation re-
lied heavily on the Department of Health, which has a staff of approxi-
mately thirty at the state level. As a matter of administrative practice,
the Department of Health reviews all permit applications to the Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation, 258 and no permit will be given
without the Department of Health's written approval. 259
The Department of Health's statutory jurisdiction with respect to
water matters concerns the quality of drinking water delivered to the
customer.26° In addition to setting scientific standards for water purity,
the agency determines proper construction standards for all new public
supply systems, and approves specific construction plans submitted by
individual systems. 26' Although the Department of Environmental Con-
servation has overall responsibility for managing New York's water re-
sources, the Department of Health is responsible for developing
254. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 120-u (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1984).
255. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1501 (McKinney 1984).
256. Interview with Stuart Dean, Chief Permit Administrator for Water Supply, Bureau of
Water Resources, New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation (Oct. 18, 1982).
257. The Department, however, was in the process of increasing its staff by regionalizing
the issuance of permits. The regionalization was completed by August 1983. New York now
has nine regions, seven upstate and two downstate. The latter two represent the areas of New
York City and Long Island. Telephone interview with Stuart Dean, Chief Permit Administra-
tor for Water Supply, Bureau of Water Resources, New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation
(Aug. 3, 1983).
258. Telephone interview with John Orndorfs, Director, Bureau of Public Water Supply,
Division of Envtl. Protection, New York Dep't of Health (Aug. 3, 1983).
259. Interview with Stuart Dean, supra note 256.
260. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1100 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1984).
261. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 5-1.22 (1981).
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comprehensive area-wide water supply plans that include provisions for
emergencies. 262
The New York Public Service Commission also has a role in the
regulation of public water supply. The Commission regulates the rates
charged to customers of investor-owned systems. A copy of any permit
application filed with the Department of Environmental Conservation by
an investor-owned system is sent to the Public Service Commission for
review. The Commission, however, does not have any standard proce-
dures for monitoring the safe yields of these systems.263 The Commis-
sion's involvement with municipally-owned systems is limited to
receiving copies of their annual reports. 264 Thus, as in Connecticut and,
to a lesser extent today with the new legislation, in New Jersey, once a
municipally-owned system receives an operating permit, no agency
monitors its performance on an on-going basis.
Southeastern New York is the region of the state most prone to
water supply shortages. This problem has been recognized for many
years, but there has been a history of state inaction. For example, the
Temporary Commission on the Water Supply Needs of Southeastern
New York issued a report in 1973 recommending the regionalization of
water supply distribution in southeastern New York under a new public
benefit corporation.265 No action was ever taken on this recommenda-
tion. During the drought of 1980-81, twenty-one communities in the re-
gion, including New York City, suffered water supply emergencies. 266
At the time of the shortages, the Department of Environmental Conser-
vation and the Task Force on Institutional Arrangements for Southeast-
ern New York Water Supply were involved in working out emergency
measures. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this cooperation pro-
duced anything more than planning advice.267
The 1980-81 water emergencies did not result in any legislation or
other institutional changes in New York, as happened in New Jersey and
Connecticut. Thus far, the only significant state-level response to the
drought in New York has been the Department of Health's request that
affected communities work with the agency's county-level officials to
262. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-1301, -1303, -1305 (McKinney 1984).
263. Telephone interview with Paul Roberts, Assistant Utility Engineer, Water Division,
New York Public Service Comm'n (Aug. 5, 1983).
264. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 89(1) (McKinney 1955).
265. TEMPORARY COMM'N ON THE WATER SUPPLY NEEDS OF SOUTHEASTERN NEW
YORK, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 247 (1973). When
this report was issued, the state's southeastern region had 481 public water supply systems
(280 investor-owned, 201 municipally-owned), and 138 small private systems serving institu-
tions, trailer parks, and apartments. Id. at Table 23.
266. 1981 Hearings, supra note 2. at 432. New York City's demand for water at that time
was 1560 mgd; the system's safe yield was 1295 mgd. Id. at 436.
267. Id. at 432.
[Vol. 12:429
WATER SUPPLY IN THE NORTHEAST
draw up emergency plans for future droughts.268
III
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historical response of the Northeastern states to periodic water
shortages, such as the recent one, has been to increase state-level regula-
tion of the water rights allocation process by establishing and refining a
permit system. This response has had positive effects. Permit systems
encourage states to develop long-term plans for water use, to manage
water resources in accordance with those plans, and to curtail wasteful
uses.
Despite these benefits, however, the case studies suggest that
changes in the method of allocating water rights have not and will not
correct the main cause of water shortages, fragmentation in the distribu-
tion of supply. Fragmentation exists in all the states of the Northeast, in
those that have instituted some form of permitting system and in those
that rely solely on the riparian rights doctrine of allocation. Fragmenta-
tion impedes capital investments to increase water supplies and intercon-
nect water systems. The recurring problem of water shortages will not be
cured until there is a significant integration of water supply systems.
A. Goals for Reforming the Legal Structure
While all states recognize private property rights in water, these
rights have been historically limited and have been increasingly subjected
to state regulation. The principle that a state's water resources should be
used in the interest of the public as a whole reflects a policy judgment
that there is no inherent reason why water resources should be allocated
to private parties in a pattern related to the ownership of real property.
The riparian rights theory was never a truly private system of allocation
in the sense that ownership of particular real property was accompanied
by an inalienable right to a certain percentage of adjacent waters. The
reasonable use doctrine reflected a judicial socialization of water rights.
Ultimately, the legal regime for water rights allocation shifted from com-
mon law rules to regulation by administrative agencies.
Today, most of the United States is served by public water supply
systems. For the Northeast, with its abundant water resources, the pri-
mary dependence on public systems means that the laws that govern and
regulate public water supply systems play a far greater role in determin-
ing the adequacy and cost of a water supply than the laws relating to the
initial allocation of water rights. The goals that the regulation of water
supply systems should serve, however, have not been well thought out.
The goal that water resources should be used to benefit the state's
268. Telephone interview with John Orndorfs, supra note 258.
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population as a whole, rather than particular well-located individuals or
municipalities, suggests two principles by which to evaluate the legal
structure that determines the adequacy and cost of the water supply for
each citizen. The first principle is that every citizen should have the
same assurance of freedom from water shortages. This means that each
water supply system in the state should have at least the minimum safe
yield ratio (the ratio of what the system would yield faced with the lowest
amount of runoff experienced in the prior hundred years to the current
average demand for the system) necessary to deliver a normal amount of
water, even in times of drought. The second principle is that, at least in
the long run, the price of water should be the same for all citizens
whether they live near or far from water sources, except for price differ-
entials related to the cost of transportation.
It might be argued that a regulatory policy based on these two prin-
ciples would be insensitive to local preferences with respect to an ade-
quate safe yield ratio. Everything else being equal, a higher safe yield
ratio (i.e., a greater degree of assurance of normal water supply in time of
drought) costs more money, and some localities might wish to buy less
water supply insurance than others. No practical institutional means ex-
ist, however, to measure how much water supply insurance localities
really want. Experience shows that when shortages occur, localities look
to the state for relief, whatever their previous decisions may indicate
about their preferred trade-off between cost and supply in time of
drought. Certainly in 1980 and 1981, many communities sought state
relief when their water supplies dwindled to levels that could last only a
few weeks. Given the demand for state relief, and the large personal and
economic disruptions that water shortages can cause, it seems safe to
assume that most persons, if forced to make an informed decision, would
prefer the extra expenditures necessary to assure normal or near-normal
supplies of water in times of drought.
B. The Need for Increased Integration of Water Supply Systems
The existing legal structure governing water supply distribution fails
to adequately promote the two principles set out above. As a result of
this legal structure water is distributed by numerous municipally-owned
and investor-owned systems, each of which operates relatively indepen-
dently of the others. These public systems have not made the invest-
ments necessary to assure adequate water supplies during droughts.
Small investor-owned companies lack the access to financial markets
needed to make capital investments. The larger municipally-owned sys-
tems tend not to ,make capital investments in order to avoid having to
raise rates and taxes.
At present, many public supply systems have inadequate safe yield
ratios. They are capable of providing water only under favorable condi-
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tions: average or above-average rainfall, plus the good luck not to have a
water main break, equipment malfunction, or other system disruption.
They are unable to provide normal water supplies when conditions are
not optimal. Furthermore, there do not appear to be any internal forces
at work within the current legal structure that will lead to the formation
of larger water supply systems better able to "provide adequate water sup-
plies during droughts.
To achieve the goal of guaranteeing all citizens sufficient water dur-
ing droughts, systems with inadequate safe yield ratios, as determined by
state water resources officials, must increase their supplies. This will re-
quire the diversion and storage of additional water, as well as the physi-
cal integration, where possible, of currently separate systems into larger
networks. Larger networks would help eliminate the safe yield deficits of
individual systems by providing access to any excess capacity within the
network, and would diversify the risks of highly localized drought condi-
tions and individual system failures.
C. The Improbability of Increased Integration Absent State-Mandated
Regionalization of Water Supply Systems
The integration of water supply systems into larger networks could
be achieved by mergers of systems or contracts among systems. Unfortu-
nately given the existing legal structure, there are insufficient forces at
work to effect further integration through either of these methods. To
understand why this is so it is necessary to examine the characteristics of
organizations currently operating water supply systems in the Northeast.
1. Mergers •
Only a few investor-owned water companies are large publicly-held
entities. 269 Most investor-owned systems are either small privately-held
companies or small operating companies owned by large holding compa-
nies. A holding company may offer its operating subsidiaries some econ-
omies of scale with respect to technical and administrative services, but
these arrangements generally do not solve the inherent problems associ-
ated with operating companies that serve small geographical areas and
few customers.
Apparently, there has not been any significant movement toward
mergers of investor-owned systems. One reason for this may be that in
some cases a municipally-owned system lies between two investor-owned
systems thereby preventing the investor-owned systems from intercon-
269. In December 1982, only 10 water supply companies traded their stock publicly, with
only the American Water Works Company, a holding company, trading on the New York
Stock Exchange. Stock Summary-Gas, Telephone, Water Utilities, PUB. UTML. FORT., Dec.
23, 1982, at 46.
1985]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
necting. 270 A second reason for the absence of mergers may be that in-
vestor-owned systems are regulated industries. An official from
Bridgeport Hydraulic Company, a company which has engaged in lim-
ited merger activity, indicated that the existing rate regulation proce-
dures create disincentives for takeovers of systems that need capital
improvements. 271 If the assets of the acquired company have been depre-
ciated, the merger, whatever it costs, adds little to the acquiring firm's
rate base.272 In addition, due to regulatory lag,273 the costs of improve-
ments cannot be added to the rate base until well after they have been
incurred. A third possible explanation for the lack of mergers is politics.
The possibility of public objection to any rate increases which ultimately
would result from capital improvements following a merger may deter
potential mergers. A proposed merger also might bring objections from
each affected municipality because, given the larger service area of the
merged system, each municipality's ability to exercise control over the
water rates paid by its residents would be weakened.
Mergers between municipally-owned systems occur even less fre-
quently than mergers between investor-owned systems. Apparently this
is because local governments are suspicious of one another. 274
2. Contracting
Contracting is frequently used by both investor-owned and munici-
pally-owned systems.2 75 Contracting is particularly attractive to a mu-
nicipally-owned system because it offers a flexible way to deal with short-
270. Mergers of water systems that cannot be physically interconnected still offer adminis-
trative and operational efficiencies of scale. Regulatory agencies are likely to discourage such
mergers, however, due to perceived difficulties in establishing a separate rate structure for each
unit where there are common costs.
271. Telephone interview with Robert H. Reinert, supra note 157.
272. In Connecticut, under Public Utilities Commission accounting procedures, assets of
the acquired company are valued at the original cost less depreciation. New Haven Water Co.
v. Board of Tax Review, 166 Conn. 232, 234, 348 A.2d 641, 643-44 (1974). Acquisition costs
related to the acquired firm's goodwill, anticipated earnings, and the like are not included in
the rate base upon which the shareholders' rate of return is calculated. These costs are not
considered "a contribution of capital to the public service." J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 177 (1961). Bonbright notes, however, that if the acquisition fur-
thered efficiency and integration in the public interest, "in such a situation, and in view of the
failure of our prevailing public utility laws to provide for compulsory mergers, a claim by the
present company that its purchase of the acquired properties was, in effect, a devotion of capi-
tal to public service, cannot be dismissed as without merit." Id.
273. "Regulatory lag" refers to the "quite usual delay between the time when reported
rates of profit are above or below standard [i.e. "fair rate of return"] and the time when the
offsetting rate decrease or increase may be put into effect by Commission order or otherwise."
J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 272, at 53.
274. See supra notes 34-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of inter-
governmental cooperation with respect to water' supply.
275. See M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 7, 104-06 (describing con-
tracting arrangements between water suppliers in New Jersey).
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term needs and poses a lesser threat than mergers to the municipality's
ability to retain control over the distribution of water. The limited scope
and duration of water supply contracts involving both municipally-
owned and investor-owned systems, however, leads to a level of integra-
tion that falls well short of what mergers could accomplish.
One major drawback of contracting is that it addresses problems in
a piecemeal fashion, substituting short-term solutions for long-term plan-
ning. C itracting is also subject to over-pricing by the supplier of
water.276 Furthermore, negotiating water supply contracts is often com-
plicated by the need to obtain the approval of a government agency.
In Connecticut, for example, investor-owned systems seeking to sell
excess water must obtain a permit, which is limited to a ten-year period,
from the Department of Environmental Protection. 277 Similarly, in New
Jersey, municipalities seeking to purchase water must limit the duration
of the contract and obtain approval from the Department of Environ-
mental Protection. 278 The short time limits placed on water contracts,
whether imposed politically or by statute, prevent the formation of water
supply networks that are secure enough to encourage the capital invest-
ments needed to improve water supply. 279
276. ACIR REPORT, supra note 49, at 34-35; Beckman & Dworsky, New Views on Public
Responsibility for Resources Development-Jurisdictions, Consequences and Remedies, in NEW
HORIZONS FOR RESOURCES RESEARCH: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 114 (1965) (proceed-
ings of the 1964 Western Resources Conference). The EPA found that purchased water costs
were higher than either groundwater or surface water in almost every instance, except for
populations of 100,000 to one million customers. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at VII-7; see
also M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 7.
277. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-358 (West Supp. 1976-1983) Permits may be re-
newed after ten years; however, this provision effectively limits the duration of contracts for
the sale of water.
The difficulties associated with contracting are illustrated by a situation in southeastern
Connecticut where the Town of Noroton, served by the Connecticut-American Water Com-
pany, needs to purchase 1.2 mgd of water. Noroton's neighbor, the Town of Norwalk, has two
quasi-municipal water supply systems, one of which, Norwalk Taxing District No. 2, has suffi-
cient supplies of water to allow a sale to Noroton. Norwalk, however, refused to contract with
Noroton until another nearby water supply system, Bridgeport Hydraulic, assured Norwalk
that it could obtain water if necessary in time of shortage. The contracting process has in-
volved two separate sets of negotiations-one between Norwalk and Bridgeport Hydraulic, the
other between Norwalk and Noroton. In addition, the parties have needed approvals from the
Department of Environmental Protection and from the Department of Public Utility Control.
Norwalk and Bridgeport have entered into a five year contract, which may be renewed for
another five years. Telephone interview with Robert H. Reinert, supra note 157. For the past
two years, however, Norwalk and Noroton have failed to reach a contractual agreement. Nor-
walk currently is supplying Noroton with 1.2 mgd on a noncontractual basis. Telephone inter-
view with John Hiscock, supra note 153.
278. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-84 (West 1967).
279. There is significant literature concerning the question of when resources are more
efficiently allocated pursuant to market contracts than by authoritative decision within an or-
ganization. See, e.g.,Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA N.S. 386 (1937); 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1-81
(1975). An important advantage of contracting is that, under appropriate circumstances, re-
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3. State-Mandated Regionalization
The foregoing discussion suggests that further integration of supply
systems can only be accomplished through state-mandated regionaliza-
tion of water distribution. The current legal structure is so protective of
local government interests that, without change, continued fragmenta-
tion and vulnerability to periodic shortages are inevitable.
D. The Empirical Case for Larger Networks
Studies of the water supply industry in the Northeast support the
view that larger public water supply networks would promote optimal
allocation of water. A 1976 analysis of water supply systems in north-
eastern New Jersey found that major intersystem transfers of water from
the Raritan basin, using existing interconnections, could have eliminated
all safe yield deficits in the Hackensack and Passaic basins.2 80 The con-
templated transfers, however, were not then and are not now possible
due to institutional impediments. 28 1 The study also concludes that, while
additional interconnections would be necessary, absent institutional bar-
riers to interbasin transfers, projected increases in demand for 1980 and
1985 could be met without construction of new sources of supply. 282
A recent study28 3 concludes that use of an "optimal water allocation
plan" by southwestern Connecticut's water supply systems would have
reduced the costs of transporting water from source to demand areas in
source use is guided by a price that aggregates in an optimal way the diverse knowledge of
many different individuals. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945). On the other hand, authoritative decisions within organizations eliminate the costs
associated with negotiating contracts and adapt more easily to changing circumstances.
Coase, supra, at 336-37. Williamson argues that certain human and environmental conditions
increase the relative attractiveness of the organizational mode compared to long-term (or re-
peated short-term) market contracting: (1) uncertainty combined with "bounded rationality"
(the inability to accurately assess the probability of future events and act accordingly because
of limitations in knowledge and in the capacity of the human mind to make complex calcula-
tions), and (2) a small number of potential parties to an exchange, combined with the possiblity
of "opportunism" (the ability of a party to gain an advantage through misrepresentation or
lack of candor). 0. WILLIAMSON, supra, at 8-10. The case studies suggest that these factors
are present in the case of water supply distribution. This does not prove, however, that water
systems rely too heavily on contracting, because it is difficult in the abstract to know how
intense these factors need to be before the resulting disadvantages of market contracting out-
weigh the inherent advantages of this method. Water supply is not like many areas of the
economy where market pressures push firms to make the optimal choices between integration
and contracting. On the contrary, there are serious political and legal obstacles to integration
which may make contracting the only viable option even if integration would be more efficient.
280. M. GREENBERG & R. HORDON, supra note 13, at 138.
281. The transfers actually could not be made due to the lack of agreements for water
transfers among the various water supply systems and local communities. Similarly, the model
ignored existing contracts where such contracts impeded optimal distribution. Id.
282. Id. at 140.
283. L. FATTARUSSO, JR. & M. ALTOBELLO, AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF IN-
TERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT (1981).
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1979 by 5.5%.284 Projections for 1985 and 2000 show similar cost reduc-
tions.285 When Bridgeport Hydraulic, which serves thirteen communi-
ties, is removed from the model the potential for further cost reductions
is even greater. This indicates that Bridgeport Hydraulic is already
"minimizing its cost . . . [and] . . .operating as a regional water
authority. '28 6
Empirical data from studies of the water supply industry as a whole
also support the view that consolidating water supply systems increases
day-to-day operating efficiency. Basing its conclusions on a random sam-
ple of 984 public water systems serving from twenty-five to 100,000 per-
sons, a 1977 EPA survey found that in "virtually every expense
category" the smaller systems had "significantly higher costs" than the
larger systems. 287
Some form of metropolitan or regional approach to water supply
distribution has been urged by organizations as disparate as the Ameri-
can Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the American
Water Works Association, a trade association of investor-owned water
companies. 288 The National Regulatory Research Institute recently cited
with approval attempts by Illinois and Florida to limit the creation of
small inefficient water supply units by actively "promoting regional water
systems, since regional service enhances the prospects for quality control,
reduces the unit cost of quality maintenance and improvement, and in-
duces economies of scale with larger treatment plants. ' 289 '.The Research
Institute also noted that regional systems offer "potentially enhanced ac-
cess to capital markets and increased ability to acquire additional sources
of supply. ' '290
E. Models of Regionalization
A state's water supply could be regionalized by using eithei a public
or a private sector approach. A private sector approach would license
private firms to manage regional systems. The firms could either sell
water directly to customers or to existing utilities on a wholesale basis.
Under a public sector approach, the state would create regional authori-
ties, but would retain authority, as a central manager, to insure compre-
hensive planning and proper financial management.
Although most Northeastern states would need to enact legislation
284. Id. at 9.
285. Id. at 11.
286. Id. at 14.
287. EPA SURVEY, supra note 45, at 11-13.
288. ACIR REPORT, supra note 49, at 101; Regionalization: Why and How, 73 J. AM.
WATER WORKS ASS'N 225 (1981).
289. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, COMMISSION REGULATION OF
SMALL WATER UTILITIES: SOME ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 70 (1983).
290. Id.
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to create either of these organizational frameworks, the primary obsta-
cles to regionalizing water distribution are not legal, but political and
financial. For example, home rule provisions in state constitutions 29 1
should not present barriers to regionalization efforts in light of the over-
whelming state concerns in the area of water resource management.
Home rule, as a broadly held doctrine suggesting the proper political
relationship between local governments and the state, however, will im-
pose a heavy burden of proof on state government in making its case for
a regional structure. 292
Another difficult issue raised by water supply regionalization relates
to the compensation of individual system members for property incorpo-
rated into the new networks. Any regional system that incorporates an
investor-owned system must pay just compensation for the property ac-
quired. In addition, fairness considerations, as well as political necessity,
may dictate that municipally-owned systems also receive some sort of
compensation.
Whether a public or a private sector approach should be used to
regionalize a state's water supply is a complex question involving a range
of political and economic issues. Although this question is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is helpful to examine some existing regionalized
water systems.
Of particular interest is the regionalization of water supply distribu-
tion in Great Britain. At the end of World War II, Great Britain's water
distribution structure, like that in the Northeast United States today, was
highly fragmented, with 1186 systems serving England and Wales. The
first step toward regionalization was the Water Act of 1945 which au-
thorized the Minister of Health to consolidate water supply systems to
291. While empowering municipalities to legislate with regard to matters of local concern,
all forms of consitutional home rule provisions recognize the state's power to preempt munici-
pal activity in matters of statewide concern. D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH, & P. SALSICH, JR.,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 104, 131 (2d ed. 1983).
292. The pattern of fragmentation, in which each municipality has its own water supply
facility, reflects the tradition of local autonomy in the Northeast, particularly in New England
and the mideastern states. This tradition of local autonomy dates back to the colonial develop-
ment of the town as a unit of government in this region, at the expense of the power of county
government. See J. MIRI, supra note 49, for a discussion of the "strong attachment to local
autonomy" which affected New Jersey's pattern of development. See also ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 245-48, 258-261 (1982) (discussing the role of the town unit of government in the
different patterns of local government structure).
Despite the Northeast's tradition of local autonomy, counties in the region recently have
increased their roles in providing governmental services. Id. at 19. Between 1967 and 1977,
the services provided by counties in New England increased by about 38%, while counties in
the mideastern states increased services by about 21%. Id. at 22. The growing role of counties
in providing government services may be attributed to a recognition that smaller units often
are unable to respond adequately to needs for urban services. Id. at 238-39. This may indicate
more willingness on the part of citizens in the Northeast to consider regional alternatives than
in the past.
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distribute water more efficiently. 293 By 1974, the number of systems had
been reduced to 187 serving a population of almost 50 million. 294 The
successful efforts of the British government in consolidating water supply
systems capable of providing water to more than ninety-nine percent of
the population "accounted in large measure for an appreciation of what
might be accomplished by further consolidation. '295
The regulation of water rights allocation in England began with the
Water Resources Act of 1963, which created a permit system adminis-
tered by twenty-nine river authorities. 296 Thus, with passage of the 1963
Act, the government regulated both water allocation and distribution.
The new regulatory scheme, however, was bifurcated: the national gov-
ernment regulated distribution, while the river authorities regulated
allocation. 297
This problem was solved with the Water Act of 1973.298 The 1973
Act divided England and Wales into ten regions and created for each
region an authority with overall responsibility for matters of both distri-
bution and allocation. Water rates are set by the water authorities sub-
ject to the requirement that all costs, "including operation and
maintenance, interest on outstanding debts, depreciation or debt redemp-
tion and a contribution toward a reserve for future capital expenditure"
be paid for out of revenues from water rates. 299 The elimination of bifur-
cated responsibility and the further consolidation of water distribution
has created a legal structure that should avoid most of the supply
problems that continue to plague the Northeastern United States.
In the United States, there have been some legislative attempts in
the area of comprehensive water supply management. For example, in
response to perceived institutional failures during a 1976 drought in
293. Water Resources Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, ch. 42. See also L. CRAINE, WATER
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN ENGLAND 36-40 (1969); Mitchell, The Institutional Frame-
work for Water Management in England and Wales, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 566, 568-70
(1970); D. OKUN, REGIONALIZATION OF WATER MANAGEMENT, A REVOLUTION IN ENG-
LAND AND WALES 19, 20 (1977).
294. D. OKUN, supra note 293, at 19.
295. Id. at 20.
296. Water Resources Act, 1963, ch. 38, §§ 3-11.
297. In examining the regulatory system created by the 1963 Water Resources Act, Pro-
fessor Craine notes that separating the power "for consolidating water distribution" from the
"water management activities of the River Authorities" made it "difficult if not impossible, to
design regional distribution and disposal systems hydrologically integrated with river manage-
ment plans and actions." L. CRAINE, supra note 293, at 108-09. In addition, the 1963 Water
Resources Act's grant of exclusive power over source development to the river authorities
frustrated the water undertakers, who were responsible for supply distribution. This division
of responsibility was a major weakness of the water management system under the 1963 Act.
D. OKUN, supra note 293, at 27; Purdue, The Implications of the Constitution and Functions of
Regional Water Authorities, 1979 PUB. L. 119.
298. Water Act, 1973, ch. 37.
299. D. OKUN, supra note 293, at 244.
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northern California, the state created a water management district for
the Monterey Peninsula. 3°° The District has the power to allocate the
region's water, particularly groundwater, 301 to construct new facilities,
subject to electoral approval, 30 2 and to consolidate distribution by acquir-
ing both public and private systems. 30 3 Despite these statutory powers,
however, the district thus far has confined itself to planning activities. 3°4
Similarly, Rhode Island's Water Resources Board has broad, but as yet
unexercised, powers to effectuate regional distribution. The Board is au-
thorized to divide "the state into areas for the purpose of providing water
supply facilities" and to designate "municipal water departments or
agencies, special districts or private firms to perform area-wide water
supply operations within each area. '30 5
These untested state models may provide limited guidance on how
to structure a regional water supply network. More useful guidance on
issues of local governmental participation in, and management of, re-
gional authorities may be found in the various existing metropolitan
water systems306 and regional authorities in other areas of utility
service. 307
CONCLUSION
The Northeastern states have no shortage of -water resources.
Problems of inadequate supply stem more from an abundance of in-
dependent public water supply systems, which are poorly regulated by
the states. It is time for states to recognize that water supply can no
longer be left to individual local governments. Reliance on voluntary
mergers and contracting among systems has left the Northeast vulnera-
ble to periodic water shortages similar to those experienced in 1980-81.
300. Monterey Peninsula Water Management District Law, 1977 Cal. Stat. S27, § 1 (codi-
fied at CAL. WATER CODE-APPENDIX §§ 118-1 to -901 (West Supp. 1984)).
301. Id. §§ 118-341 to -366. The District can establish charges for the withdrawal of
groundwater from within specified zones; monies raised must be used primarily to import
water into the zone to prevent the groundwater from being overdrafted.
302. Id. § 118-452.
303. Id. § 118-328(a).
304. Smith, Regional Allocation of Water Resources, 73 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N 226,
230 (1981).
305. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-15-6(f)(1), (2) (Supp. 1980). The City of Providence water
supply system presently serves 55% of the state's population and has the capacity to expand its
service in the future. Therefore, it provides substantial regionalization of distribution, making
it unlikely that the Water Resources Board will need to use its power. Telephone interview
with Peter Calise, Staff Director, Rhode Island Water Resources Board (Aug. 2, 1982).
306. For example, the Metropolitan District of California sells water at wholesale prices to
member municipalities, whose systems in turn deliver the water to customers in southern
California.
307. For example, the New York State Power Authority supplies one-quarter of the state's
electric power at wholesale pricks. In Nebraska, regional power districts provide all of the
state's electricity, some of which is acquired from the jointly operated Nebraska Public Power
District.
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Attention to water rights allocation will not, absent changes in the struc-
tural arrangements for the diversion and ultimate distribution of water
supply, prevent future shortages. Regionalization is necessary. A re-
gional network for public water supply woild have the legal and financial
capability to insure adequate water supply during droughts. At the same
time, it would minimize the current inequities in the amount of water
available to citizens based on their location within the state.

